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INTRODUCTION

Real property taxation in many states has long been characterized by a conflict between statutory and constitutional requirements of uniform full value assessment and the universal
administrative practice of discriminatory fractional assessment.'
In a series of decisions in seven states, starting with Connecticut
and New Jersey in 1957, state supreme courts have announced
the necessity of bringing practice into conformity with requirement.2 At the same time, and with increasing effectiveness, courts
1. See, e.g., F.L. BIRD, THE GENERAL

PROPERTY TAX: FINDINGS OF THE

1957

CENSUS OF

31-35 (Pub. Admin. Serv. 1960); Shannon, Conflict Between State Assessment Law and Local Assessment Practice, in PROPERTY TAXATIN-U.S.A. 39 (R. Lindholm ed. 1967).
2. The decisions, listed in chronological order, are:
Connecticut: E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563
(1957). See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
New Jersey: Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957). See text
accompanying notes 46-51 infra.
Massachusetts:Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961).
See text accompanying notes 68-86 infra.
Florida: Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965). See text accompanying notes 117127 infra.
Kentucky: Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965). See text accompanying notes
136-146 infra.
Tennessee: Southern Ry. v. Clement, 57 Tenn. App. 54, 415 S.W.2d 146 (1967). See text
accompanying notes 147-157 infra.
New York: Hellerstein v. Assessor of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388
(1975). The Hellerstein court referred to the sister-state decisions by stating: "In recent
years the high courts in several States, noting the mounting criticism, have held that full
value means what it says and that the practice of fractional assessments is illegal." Id. at
13, 332 N.E.2d at 286, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (citations omitted).
The court of appeals' list is not exhaustive. An article published in 1974 lists four
other states-Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Ohio-in which similar relief was
granted. Clement, Discriminationin Real PropertyTax Assessment: A LitigationStrategy
for Pennsylvania,36 U. PIr. L. Rxv. 285, 305 n.77 (1974). Clement presents an interesting
analysis of the fractional assessment process from a racial discrimination point of view.
GOVERNMENTS
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and legislatures have dealt with the problems faced by taxpayers
assessed at a lower than the mandated full value, but at a higher
fraction than the common ratio. 3 In the past two years, the New
York Court of Appeals considered both of these issues in two
separate cases: Hellerstein v. Assessor of Islip,4 an action in which
a taxpayer sought to enforce the public right to have all property
assessed at full value, and Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold,5 in
which a taxpayer sought to vindicate his private right not to be
overassessed in relation to other taxpayers.'
7
In a previous piece about the fractional assessment problem,
I argued that this universal practice could not be explained entirely by lack of skill, susceptibility to improper political influence, or other failings on the part of assessors. Rather, fractional
assessment in large part reflected policy decisions by assessors
3. "Common ratio," as used in this article, refers to the average or prevailing ratio
between assessed value and full value in a particular assessing jurisdiction. See Comment,
Tax Assessments of Real Property:A Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 68 YALE L.J. 335,
348 n.59 (1958). See generally Note, Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures
for an Old 11, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1374 (1962).
For the history of New York's attempt to remedy these problems see Koeppel,
Inequality in Real Property Tax Review, 19 BUFFALO L. Rav. 565 (1970); Siegel, Guth, 860
and Hellerstein; A Revolution in the World of Real Property Tax Assessment, 23 THE
NASSAU LAW., Oct. 1975, at 31.
For a discussion of the problems of measuring and proving common ratio see text
accompanying notes 12-14 infra and note 14 infra; for discussion of the statistical measurement of common ratio see notes 19-21 infra.
4. 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975). Hellersteingranted mandamus to require the assessors of Islip to reassess all real property in the town at its full value
by Dec. 31, 1976. Id. at 14, 332 N.E.2d at 287, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 400. Islip's time to comply
was thereafter extended to July 1, 1978. Hellerstein v. Assessor of Islip, 39 N.Y.2d 920,
332 N.E.2d 279, 386 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1976). Proceedings have been brought in a number of
other jurisdictions in New York State to require assessors to reassess at full value.
Williams, Lawsuits Filed Against County Assessments, Utica Observer-Dispatch, Dec. 1,
1976, at 1, col. 1 (three cases in Oneida County); Gerber v. Valenza, No. 3635-76 (Sup.
Ct., Rockland County, Aug. 12, 1976) (Town of Orangetown); Aloi v. Doolittle, No. 964775 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County, Nov. 25, 1975) (Town of Mendon); Carette Realty Corp. v.
Wolven, No. 8705 (Sup. Ct., Greene County, Dec. 29, 1975) (Town of Catskill). In addition, an action of this type has been filed against a county board of assessors, Forte v.
Board of Assessors, No. 13535-76 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County).
5. 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441,358 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1974). Guth held that a taxpayer
could rely on the state equalization rate to establish the prevailing assessment ratio in
the taxing jurisdiction. Id. at 449-50, 315 N.E.2d at 445, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 372-73.
6. The distinction between "public" and "private" tax assessment litigation is made
in Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. supra note 3, at 1381, 1386.
7. Comment, 68 YALE L.J., supra note 3. While student work was then published in
Journal as the collective work of the student editors, I cannot cite or rely on this
Law
the
work without identifying myself as the student author, and, with thanks to the officers
and members of the Board of Editors who contributed to it, taking responsibility for its
opinions.
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and, to a lesser extent, by reviewing courts, responding to a variety of social and economic needs. These have included the need
to maintain municipal fiscal integrity in periods of depression
and to restrain municipal spending during periods of inflation,
the desire to subsidize unprofitable industries important to the
local economy and, in some cases, an attempt to make the tax less
regressive.' If these observations are valid, judicial decisions calling attention to the longstanding statutory and constitutional full
value requirements are unlikely to be effective, unless the problems underlying fractional assessment are also considered.
Therefore, although Hellerstein and Guth have been widely
hailed as likely to revolutionize real property assessment,9 I take
a more cautionary, "wait and see" attitude"° and in this article
examine the experience in the six other states which have
witnessed Hellerstein-type decisions. Their experience makes it
clear that implementing the court's simple mandate to obey the
law requires strong supporting legislative and administrative action. Indeed, it seems likely that the practical consequences of
Guth will, in the long run, do more to achieve full value assessment in New York than the pronouncements of Hellerstein.
I.

MEASUREMENT OF ASSESSMENT QUALITY"

The question of full value assessment is highly complex; not
the least of the complexities are those which are involved in defining and measuring value. It is now commonplace that "value"
8. Id. at 336-41.
9. See, e.g., Tomasson, Bungalow On FireIsland Makes Legal History, N.Y. Times,
July 6, 1975, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1 (relating to Hellerstein);Newsday, June 6, 1975,
at 3 (relating to Hellerstein); N.Y. Times, July 21, 1974, § 11 (BQLI), at 1, col. 3 (relating
to Guth); Siegel, supra note 3 (relating to both decisions).
10. This attitude is not unique. Nine years ago, a leading economic scholar of real
estate taxation wrote:
The growing unwillingness of the courts to tolerate tacit assessment standards,
usually badly administered, which are inconsistent with state constitutional or
legal standards, has driven state legislatures in two directions. On the one hand,
some states. . . have adopted explicit fractional standards with which they felt
assessors could live. In a number of others . . . there have been local or state.
wide moves to honor constitutional provisions calling for full value assessments.
It is too early to determine which trend, if either, will predominate.

Aaron, Full Value Assessment, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND

STATE ADMINISTRATION

153, 158-

59 (A. Lynn, Jr. ed. 1967). On the evidence presented in this article, I conclude that the
question is still open.
11. "Assessment quality" as used in this article refers to the extent to which assessments achieve three goals: (1) conformity to the statutory standard of full value; (2)
equality between classes of property; (3) equality between particular taxpayers of the
same class.
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means different things in different contexts."' Even when a particular measure is accepted, such as the standard of actual sales in
the open market which has become accepted in full value scholarship, 3 grave difficulties persist because of the way that the real
estate market operates. In contrast to the public sale of securities
on a stock exchange or of farm products on a commodities exchange, the sale of real estate is invariably negotiated privately,
frequently treated with confidentiality by the parties and often
influenced by nonrealty factors. Such factors include financing
terms, income tax consequences and the inclusion of personal
property-ranging from appliances and furniture in the sale of a
one-family home to trade fixtures and good will in the sale of a
business property. The difficulty in defining and measuring the
full value of all of the property on a given tax roll has resulted in
primary reliance on statistical samples by those who review the
4
work of assessors.'

Among the most comprehensive sources of information about
real estate tax assessment practices are samples gathered and
published every five years by the Census Bureau in its Census of
Governments. '5 In these publications the Bureau reports the re12. See, e.g., Aaron, Some Observations on Property Tax Valuation and the Significance of Full Value Assessment, in THE PROPERTY TAX 153-56 (A. Lynn, Jr. ed. 1969);
Groves, Is the Property Tax Conceptually and PracticallyAdministrable, in id. at 15-17;
Comment, 68 Yale L.J., supra note 3, at 344-47. The basic truth as to the various nature
of value was fundamentally pointed out in 1 J. BONBPIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 4-5
(1937).
13. Actual sales are the basis of the Census of Governments reports discussed at notes
15-17 infra, which have formed the basis of most recent studies of assessment performance.
See BIRD, supra note 1; Shannon, supra note 1, at 39. The census relies exclusively on
sales, rather than on appraisals to determine market value, because of "the limitations of
funding and staff available. . . in attempting to get market values for 112,000 parcels of
property transferred during the 1971 sample period." Criz, The Census of Government's
Assessment Ratio Study, in 6 INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT ADMINISTRATION 153
(Proceedings of the 39th Annual Int'l Conference on Assessment Admin. 1964).
14. In the public full value litigation discussed in this article, the fact of fractional
assessment has been shown in several ways: (1) by stipulation as to the express acts of
the assessors, see E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 375-76, 132
A.2d 563, 564 (1957); Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 225-26, 178
N.E.2d 10, 11-12 (1961); Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 584, 130 A.2d 15,
17 (1957); (2) through "common knowledge," see Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694,
695 (Ky. 1965); (3) through state board of equalization studies, see id. at 695; Switz v.
Township of Middletown, supra at 584, 130 A.2d at 17; and (4) through surveys of actual
sales, see Southern Ry. v. Clement, 57 Tenn. App. 54, 57, 415 S.W.2d 146, 148 (1967).
The proper measure of the prevailing assessment ratio is one of the principal issues
in private inequality cases and is discussed in the text accompanying notes 39-45, 59-67,
98-105 infra.
15. The three Census of Governments reports used in this article are: 2 U.S. BUREAu
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sults of a study it conducts of selected assessing jurisdictions in
each state during a six-month period in the year prior to publication, in which actual sales are selected, the price and arm'slength nature of the sales are verified by questionnaire, and tabulations of the ratios of market price to assessed value are made. 8
These studies are subject to several caveats as to accuracy, representative quality, reliability and comparability." Notwithstanding these reservations, they are the soundest data I know of to
study assessments in a variety of states.
The 1962, 1967 and 1972 Census Bureau figures on assessment quality for the six states which have had Hellerstein-type
decisions are summarized in Appendices I, II and III.
Appendix I presents statewide assessed value to market
value ratios for properties itemized by use, i.e., residential, commercial and industrial, vacant lots, and farm and acreage. These
ratios show the total assessment of the sampled parcels as a percentage of the total of the market value. They give an idea of how
assessments in total relate to market value in total, but offer no
indication of how individual assessments relate to individual
market values. These ratios also give some idea of the degree of
uniformity among different use classifications of property. To
highlight this, I have computed and shown in Appendix I the ratio
of interclass uniformity, which is the difference between the ratios achieved in the highest and lowest classes, expressed as a
percentage of the overall value."
Appendix II is concerned with assessed value to market value
ratios for single-family, nonfarm residences, presented for selected assessing jurisdictions. Because properties and sales in this
class are most numerous, the Census Bureau presents detailed
ratios for smaller than statewide areas only for this class. Three
ratios are provided: (1) aggregate assessment-sales price ratio; 9
1962 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES (U.S. Dep't of
Commerce 1963) [hereinafter cited as 1962 CENSUS RATIOS]; 2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 CENSUS RATIOS]; 2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
1972 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES AND ASSESSMENT-SALES PRICE
RATIOS (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972 CENSUS RATIOS].
16. 1972 CENSUS RATIOS, supra note 15, at 21-22, 149-50. Because new construction
may be assessed on a vacant or partially completed basis f6r periods after it is sold, new
houses were excluded from the survey.
17. Id. at 22-24.
18. See Appendix I at page 281 infra.
19. Aggregate assessment-salesprice ratio is the sum of assessed values for all the
sold properties involved, divided by the sum of sales prices for all the respective properties,
OF THE CENSUS,
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(2) unweighted mean assessment-sales price ratio;" and (3)
median assessment-sales price ratio. 21 These ratios2 2 are usually
within a few percentage points of each other. To avoid the necessity of having to choose which ratio to use as the basis for my
with the result expressed as a percentage. 1972 CENSUS RATIos, supra note 15, at 27. This
is the method of measuring overall ratio mandated by the New York courts for use in
assessment tax review proceedings where a number of nonrandomly selected sample parcels are used. People ex rel. Yaras v. Kinnaw, 303 N.Y. 224, 233-34, 101 N.E.2d 474, 478
(1951). See Koeppel, supra note 3, at 565-66.
20. Unweighted mean assessment-sales price ratio is the sum of the assessment
ratios computed separately for each sold parcel, divided by the number of sold parcels.
1972 CENSUS RATios, supra note 15, at 26-27.
21. Median assessment-salesprice ratio is the assessment sales price ratio "above
and below which lie an equal number of values. If the array contains an odd number of
values, the median is the middle value. If the array contains an even number of values,
the median is the mean of the two middle values." 1972 CENsus RATIos, supranote 15, at
26.
22. The computation of these values may be illustrated by assuming 10 sales with
the following assessed values and sales prices:

Sale No.

Assessed
Value

Sales
Price

Sales Price
Assessment
Ratio

1

8,400

84,000

10%

2

15,000

100,000

15%

3

5,920

37,000

16%

4

22,000

100,000

22%

5

8,960

28,000

32%

6

27,880

82,000

34%

7

17,050

31,000

55%

8

14,030

23,000

61%

9

22,440

33,000

68%

10

22,040

29,000

76%

163,720

547,000

Totals

389

Based on these values:
Aggregate assessment sales price ratio = 163,720 = 30.0%
547,000
Unweighted mean assessment sales price ratio = 389 = 38.9%
10
Median assessment sales price ratio = 32 + 34 = 33.0%
2
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conclusions, the range of these ratios is presented in Appendix
11.23

Appendix III shows the spread of the coefficient of intra-area
dispersions 24 computed by the Census Bureau for each area that
it surveys. This coefficient measures the closeness with which the
assessment to sales price ratios for single-family, nonfarm dwellings within the assessing unit cluster around the median assessment to sales price ratio in that unit. The lower the coefficient,
the tighter the cluster and the more uniform the assessments are
within the area. 25 A coefficient of intra-area dispersion of more
than twenty percent is generally regarded as showing bad, i.e.,
nonuniform assessment, and one of under ten percent would generally be recognized as resulting from uniform assessments. "
23. See Appendix II at page 282 infra.
24. "Based on an array of the ratios for individual sales sampled within the jurisdiction, this measure expresses as a percentage the result of dividing the mean of deviations
from the median ratio (regardless of sign) by that median ratio." 1972 CENSUS RATIOS,
supra note 15, at 13. See Appendix m at page 283 infra.
The same figures assumed in note 22 supra, would produce the following coefficient
of intra-area dispersion:
Deviation
From
Median

Sales Price
Assessment
Ratio

-23
-18
-17
-11
- 1
+ 1
+22
+28
+35
+43

10
15
16
22
32
34
55
61
68
76
Median

33
199

Sum Disregarding Sign
Mean of Deviations

199 = 19.9
10

Coefficient of Intra-area Dispersion

19.9 = .6
33

25. Appendix m shows only the coefficient of intra-area dispersion for single-family,
nonfarm dwellings, which was the only such coefficient reported in all three years. Similar
figures for vacant plotted lots and all types of realty were published for the first time in
1972. 1972 CENSUS RATos, supra note 15, at 62 (Table 11). See id. at 14 (Table J).
26. BIRD, supra note 1, at 54. The author points out:
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Where between these limits the boundary between good and bad
assessment lies is a matter of conjecture. 7
The statistical evidence makes it quite clear that if the Census Bureau figures are accurate, Kentucky alone has achieved
both substantial full value assessment and a high degree of uniformity between different classes of property and different taxpayers within the most numerous class of "single-family
homes. 2 81 Florida made some progress in both particulars, but
this progress appears to have been temporary.29 Tennessee has
How low the index must be to indicate good quality assessment must be
determined largely by what successful local assessment administrations have
been able to accomplish. . . The late Dr. John H. Russell, former director of
research for the Virginia Department of Taxation, who emphasized this measure
as an "index of assessment inequality" some 20 years ago, is reported to have
established that "'an index as low as 20 should be considered a goal desirable
of achievement and reasonably attainable,' that anything below this is to be
considered as an excellent degree of equalization for uniformity," and that" 'an
index as high as 45 should be judged cause for the gravest concern.'"
Having as a goal an index of 20 appears to be a rather modest objective that
still allows the assessor a wide tolerance. . . .There is some opinion that a
considerably lower index than 20 is necessary for really acceptable assessment.
A Minnesota tax study committee has stated that "a coefficient of dispersion
of 10 per cent or less suggests that the assessor is performing his job well."
However, it must be kept in mind, as noted earlier, that "sales as well as
assessments are not perfect," so that to some degree a coefficient of dispersion
is influenced by differences among pairs of buyers and sellers as to the worth of
sold properties. Accordingly, some amount of dispersion appears inevitable.
Id. (citations omitted). Professor Netzer characterizes the above statement as "now widely
accepted" as "the standard of excellence," but goes on to rather unfairly attribute to Bird
the rule that "a jurisdiction does a good job" if its coefficient of intra-area dispersion is
20% or less. D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 177 (Brookings Institution 1966).

Professor Netzer further suggests that in nonproperty tax administration, such as sales or
income tax administration, a range of error of 5%-10% would be the standard, and that
in any event, performance should be measured with respect to all kinds of property, and
not just the easier-to-assess, easier-to-measure, nonfarm residential classification. Id. at
177-80. Accord, NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, IMPROVING REAL
PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION 2-5 (1974); contra, Groves, supra note 12, at 18-25 (where
the author argues that a 20% coefficient is deemed acceptable).
At least one court has used a 10% coefficient of intra-area dispersion as a yardstick
of good assessment. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation v. Borough of Bogota, 104 N.J. Super.
499, 250 A.2d 440 (Law Div. 1969), aff'd mem., 114 N.J. Super. 140, 275 A.2d 158 (App.
Div. 1971).
27. Based on the same sources cited in note 24 supra.
28. Kentucky's overall 1972 assessment ratio of 84% was the highest reported for any
state; its interclass variation was the lowest (Appendix I). While there was a slight slippage from the 1967 level, when all jurisdictions sampled had a single-family assessment
ratio of over 80%, the 1972 figures show all over 60%, and 93% over 80% (Appendix H). In
addition, 93% of the Kentucky jurisdictions sampled had acceptable or better coefficient
of intra-area dispersion, of which 20% were excellent in 1967 (Appendix III).

29. Florida's overall assessment ratio for single-family houses increased from 48% in
1962 to 78% in 1967, and then dropped to 63% in 1972 (Appendix I). The concentration of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 1

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

made progress in achieving uniformity of the single-family dwelling assessment between jurisdictions, but not between different
taxpayers in this class, not between different classes of property,
and certainly not at full value. 3 Progress in the other three
Jersey-has been
states-Connecticut, Massachusetts and New
3
limited both geographically and temporally. '
The literature on tax assessments confirms these general
impressions. Kentucky prides itself on having solved the full
value problem.3" Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey are
still actively struggling with the problem and are considering alternatives.3 3
III.

THE FULL VALUE DECISIONS AND THE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE

RESPONSE

The continuing differences in assessment patterns in the six
states under consideration are the result of variations in assessment laws and practices before their full value decisions, the
assessment ratios for single-family homes likewise moved from the 41%-60% range in 1962
(Appendix II). The percentage of acceptable coefficients of intra-area dispersion moved
from 29% to 76% between 1962 and 1972, but had been 88% in 1967 (Appendix Ill).
Moreover, residences are still apparently overassessed (63%) compared with other classes
of property (37%-50%) (Appendix I).
30. Tennessee showed 100% of its sampled jurisdictions in one class-20%-40%- for
single-family home assessment ratios (Appendix II). For a description of legislation requiring 25% assessment, see text at notes 174-175 infra. While the interclass variation
declined from 63% in 1962 to 21% in 1972 (due to an increase in the assessment ratio of
vacant plotted lots) (Appendix I), the 21% figure is not low and the performance indicated
by the coefficient of interclass variation was far worse in 1972 than in 1962 (Appendix III).
31. This is apparent from Appendices I, II and II.

32. E. D.

BALLARD, RECENT EVENTS IN PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION IN

(La. Mfg. Ass'n 1966); Note, PropertyAssessment Remedies for the Kentucky Taxpayer, 60 Ky. L.J. 84, 103 (1971). For a view that although the 1965 Kentucky
full value decision of Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965), resulted in increasing the assessed value of all property in the state from $3.2 billion in 1965 to $12.8 billion
in 1968, the traditional defects and inequalities in assessment remain, see Note, Property
Tax Assessment Administration in Kentucky, 60 Ky. L.J. 141 (1971).
33. E.g., W.C. WHEATON, THE STATEWIDE IMPACT OF FULL PROPERTY REVALUATION IN
MASSACHUSETTS (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 1975); ADV. COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROPERTY TAX IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED STATE
STUDIES 88 (Gov't Printing Office 1974) (Florida: "[Tihere has been only partial progress
toward the 'full-value' standard of valuation legally specified for most taxable property"),
80-82 (Connecticut: account of 1972 recommendations by Governor's Commission on Tax
Reform for, inter alia, full value assessment laws, which were not adopted), and 179 (New
Jersey: "[Slome assessing jurisdictions in the State still fall short of standards of assessment uniformity which have been established as a goal"). As to Connecticut, see note 166
infra (dealing with extension of time to 1978 to go to 70% value); as to New Jersey, see
note 218 infra (dealing with refusal of Newark City Council to reassess).
KENTUCKY 8-11
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judicial followup to the initial decision, and the legislative response.
A. The Underlying Facts and the Judicial Response
1. The First Wave: Connecticut and New Jersey
a. Connecticut: No Remedy at All
Although the Hellerstein court cited the Connecticut decision of E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol34 as precedent
for judicial relief against partial assessment, Ingraham did not
really go that far. Connecticut's statutory requirement of full
value assessment originated in 1860.11 Since 1893 the Connecticut
courts have held that a taxpayer assessed at a higher ratio than
that illegally prevailing would have its assessment reduced to the
prevailing level. 6 In Ingraham it was stipulated that different
classes of property throughout the city were assessed at 50%, 90%,
and 100% of full value. A taxpayer who owned property in all
three classes sought to have the 90% and 100% assessments,
which were used for personalty and motor vehicles, reduced to the
50% level which was used only for real estate. 7 The court reversed
its longstanding rule, but acknowledged that' it was
[u]nable to give categorical answers to the questions
propounded. We can answer only generally by stating that the
assessors acted contrary to law in assessing the plaintiff's property, save [those assessed at 100%] and that the board of tax
review did not act illegally in refusing the plaintiffs request for
reduction of the [90 and 100% assessments] .... 38
Thus, the Connecticut Court of Errors did not order reassessment; it merely refused to order further reductions of assessments
34. 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957).
35. Act of May 31, 1860, ch. 15, § 1 [1860] Conn. Pub. Acts 11 (current version at
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-64 (1975)). Ingraham traces the legislative and judicial history of
the full value requirement to the 1957 form. 144 Conn. at 379, 132 A.2d at 565-66.
36. Randell v. City of Bridgeport, 63 Conn. 321, 28 A. 523 (1893), was the first of such
cases.
37. E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 376, 132 A.2d 563, 564

(1957).
38. Id. at 383, 132 A.2d at 567. The case had been referred to the Court of Errors on
four questions: (1) should taxpayers have been assessed on the basis of the full value of
their property, rather than on the assessed value; (2) did the assessors err in establishing
different classes of taxable property; (3) did the Board of Tax Review err in refusing to
reduce the assessment to 50% of full value; and (4) did the Board err in reducing the
assessment to the average level of the entire roll. Id. at 376-77 n.1, 132 A.2d at 564-65 n.1.
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to illegal levels, perhaps expecting taxpayers to proceed that way
in another case.
In later cases, however, the Connecticut court found it
necessary to continue to offer relief to individual taxpayers,
even though the assessors still were not complying with statutory standards, by this time revised. 9 In Lerner Shops v. Town

of Waterbury,40 the court noted that although the statute then

required the assessors to undertake a three-step processdetermine full value, establish the uniform percentage to be
applied (which could be less than 100%), and compute the
assessment-the Waterbury assessors went directly to the third
step. 4' In reviewing the assessment, therefore, the court, after
finding the "true value," could not apply a ratio established by
the assessors, since the assessors had not established a ratio. The
court could only, and in fact did, apply the average ratio established by petitioners' conventional proof of assessment ratio. 2 In
Kraus v. Klee, 3 a group of taxpayers sought to collect a penalty
from the assessors for doing "an unlawful act, '4 4 i.e., assessing at
varying percentages of full value. This relief was denied because
none of the plaintiffs was an aggrieved party.

b. New Jersey: Remedy Deferred
Of the six decisions cited in Hellerstein, only Switz v. Township of Middletown,41 a 1957 case, included dissenting opinions.
The majority opinion and a concurrence sustained a mandamus
to the assessor of Middletown to assess at full value and ordered
39. See text accompanying notes 158-65 infra.
40. 151 Conn. 79, 193 A.2d 472 (1963).
41. Id. at 85, 193 A.2d at 475-76.
42. Id. at 90-92, 193 A.2d at 477-78. In three other cases coming before the Connecticut courts under the 1957 amendment which required that real property "shall be liable
to taxation at a uniform percentage of its present true and actual valuation," see note 162
infra and accompanying text, the uniform percentage was stipulated, thus avoiding any
problems. New Departure Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Town & City of Bristol, 25 Conn.
Supp. 37, 195 A.2d 770 (1963) (50% of uniform percentages); Bridgeport Gas Co. v. Town
of Stratford, 153 Conn. 333, 216 A.2d 439 (1966) (70% uniform percentages; the property
involved was tangible personal property of a utility); Federated Dep't Stores Inc. v. Board
of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 291 A.2d 715 (1971) (65% uniform percentages).
43. 5 Conn. Cir. 193, 248 A.2d 515 (1968).
44. Id., 248 A.2d at 515. The court cited the relevant part of CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 12170 (1964) which provided: "Each assessor. . . who does any unlawful act. . . connected
with the . . . assessment . . . shall forfeit fifty dollars to the person aggrieved
thereby .... "
45. Kraus v. Klee, 5 Conn. Cir. 193, 198-99, 248 A.2d 515, 517 (1968).
46. 23 N.J. 580, 614, 130 A.2d 15, 33 (1957).
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the Township to appropriate the funds needed to allow the assessor to comply. The decision, however, postponed the effectiveness
of the mandamus for two years in order to allow necessary administrative and legislative reaction. 47 In his dissent, Justice Wachenfeld quoted the majority's view that "the problem is basically
legislative and administrative,"48 but rather than just
"postpon[e] the enforcement of its decree for three years, hoping
to be rescued from its own decision by the Legislature in the
meantime,"4 9 Justice Wachenfeld opined that the court should
have refused to "sweep away almost a century of precedent"' " and
thus should have refused to grant mandamus. The other dissent,
by Chief Justice Vanderbilt and Justice Jacobs, urged that
[t]he question before us is whether we will 'recognize the clear
and unmistakable mandate of the statutes for assessment at
true value and direct performance of the solemn duty of the
defendants to assess at true value or ignore it and make ourselves a party to the positive disregard of the statutes.5
Faced with this choice, these justices would have made the mandamus effective forthwith.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has considered the question
of full value assessment on five occasions since Switz v. Township
of Middletown. Three of these were "public" cases concerned
with the entire roll, while two were "private" actions concerning
individual taxpayers who tried to lower their own assessments.
The three public cases were Switz v. Kingsley 2 and two cases
each entitled Bergen County Board of Taxation v. Borough of
Bogota.13 In Switz v. Kingsley, the court upheld the local option
47. The court held:
[Tihe mandate otherwise shall not apply to the tax years 1957 and 1958,
thereby to afford the Legislature the opportunity to take such measures and
provide for such administrative procedures as its own inquiry may prove to be
essential to the public interest, and to allow the Township time needed for the
fulfillment of the project.
Id. at 598, 130 A.2d at 25.
48. Id. at 615, 130 A.2d at 34 (Wachenfeld, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Justice
Wachenfeld).
49. Id. at 616, 130 A.2d at 34-35 (Wachenfeld, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 617, 130 A.2d at 35 (Wachenfeld, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 633, 130 A.2d at 44 (Vanderbilt, C.J. & Jacobs, J., dissenting).
52. 37 N.J. 566, 182 A.2d 841 (1962).
53. In the first case, reported at 104 N.J. Super. 499, 250 A.2d 440 (1969), the court
expressed approval of a County Board of Taxation order to jurisdictions with equalized
values of less than 85% and "coefficients of deviation" of greater than 10% to reassess,
but refused to enforce the order because the required approval of the State Director of the
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aspect of a 1960 statute passed to substitute for a locally selected
uniform ratio for full value. 54 Because local assessments are used
only to raise taxes for local services, there was no unlawful discrimination in unequal treatment of equally situated landowners
in different counties. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however,
limited preferential classification of agricultural property to enforce the state constitutional requirement of "uniformity.""' In
the Bergen County cases, a county board of taxation so seriously
viewed its statutory duty to establish a "percent of true value
. . . as the level of taxable value to be applied uniformly through
the County,"" that it established a 100% rate, and brought suit
to compel local assessors to reassess accordingly. The court
granted mandamus after first refusing to do so." In addition, the
court issued a directive to the borough to appropriate the necessary funds.5" Thus, twelve years after Switz v. Township of
Middletown, the court was again granting virtually the same relief. This time, however, it was on a county-by-county, rather
than on a statewide basis.
The two private cases, In re Kents5 9 and Siegal v. City of
Newark,60 represent a significant change in New Jersey law. In
Division of Taxation had not been obtained. In the second case, reported at 114 N.J.
Super. 140, 275 A.2d 158 (App. Div. 1971), the court upheld the County Board of Taxation
order after such approval had been obtained.
54. 37 N.J. 566, 570-79, 182 A.2d 841, 842-48 (1962). The legislation involved was Act
of June 15, 1960, ch. 51, §§ 1-2, [1960] N.J. Laws 432 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
54:4-2.25 to 4-2.26 (West 1960)). A second group of attack, that the 1960 legislation was
"local or special," was also rejected. Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 579-80, 182 A.2d 841,
848 (1962).
55. The court invalidated Act of June 15, 1960, ch. 51, § 23, [1960] N.J. Laws 444
(current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-1 (West Supp. 1976)), which required that
determination of value of land actively devoted to agricultural use "shall not be deemed
to include prospective value for subdivisions or non-agricultural use." This was ruled
"plainly invalid" because it effectively set up a different standard of value for agricultural
land than for other real estate. Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 585-86, 182 A.2d 841, 851
(1962).
The remaining portions of the legislation which the court upheld granted preferential
treatment to agricultural machinery and livestock. This was upheld as a reasonable legislative classification and determination that such benefit conferred would further "the
total interest of the public." Id. at 596, 182 A.2d at 851. The invalid portions relating to
land were distinguished because here the standard of value was unaffected; the section
merely set a different level for "taxable 'value." Id.
56. Act of June 15, 1960, ch. 51, § 1, [1960] N.J. Laws 432 (codified at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 54:4-2.25 (West 1960)).
57. See note 53 supra.
58. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation v. Borough of Bogota, 114 N.J. Super. 140, 145,
275 A.2d 158, 161 (App. Div. 1971).
59. 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961).
60. 38 N.J. 57, 183 A.2d 21 (1962).
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these cases, the court reduced challenged assessments to a common ratio, as there was no proof of a level of "taxable value" set
as required by the 1960 statute. This suggests that the enactment
simply restored the situation as it was prior to Switz v. Township
of Middletown." New Jersey had long denied relief to a taxpayer
whose property was assessed at less than full value, but at more
than the general level of assessments.6 2 In 1946 the United States
Supreme Court condemned this rule as a denial of equal protection, 3 and in 1954 the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed its
prior ruling, granting relief in private actions.64 The difficulty in
proving the prevailing level of assessment, however, still made
effective relief hard to achieve when the assessor would not stipulate to a realistic rate. In In re Kents the plaintiff claimed assessment at higher than the common ratio. When the assessors "disavowed consciousness of a specific ratio and portrayed the total
picture as the result of the hit-and-miss product of years of inattention, "65 the taxpayer countered by proving the ratio found by
the State Board of Equalization for purposes of intermunicipal
equality. Accepting this claim, the court granted substantially
the same relief as did the New York Court of Appeals in Guth66
fourteen years later. Thus, for the first time, the court made
individual relief easily available to New Jersey taxpayers."
61. 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957). Under the statute and case law as it stood prior
to Switz, a taxpayer complaining of relative overassessment could appeal to the County
Board of Taxation, then to the State Division of Tax Appeals, and then to the courts, all
of which were required to reduce individual assessments to the common ratio of full value
in jurisdictions where fractional assessment prevailed. Gibraltar Corrugated Paper Co. v.
Township of N. Bergen, 20 N.J. 213, 222-23, 119 A.2d 135, 139-40 (1955).
62. E.g., Royal Mfg. Co. v. Board of Equalization of Taxes, 76 N.J.L. 402, 70 A. 978
(1908), aff'd, 78 N.J.L. 337, 74 A. 525 (1909).
63. Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
64. Baldwin Constr. Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 108 A.2d 598
(1954). See generally Lasser, Assessment of Real Property in New Jersey; An Appraisal
of the Baldwin Case, 9 RUTGERs L. REv. 497 (1955).

65. In re Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 27, 166 A.2d 763, 766 (1961).
66. Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d
367 (1974).
67. The court articulated its view of the relationship between availability of relief in
private actions and effective enforcement of relief in public actions by stating:
Moreover the remedy we find appropriate has an added virtue, for if a flood
of appeals should ensue or be feared, it may well quicken the official conscience
and induce the district to revalue and to keep the rolls current. It must be borne
in mind that whether the standard of valuation is full true value or such percentage of it as may in the future be established. . . the vice of unequal treatment
will persist so long as the assessor fails to do his job. The remedy of Switz and
the remedy we here find suitable will combine, we hope, to excite the assessor
to proper performance.
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Ignoring Full Value: Massachusetts

Massachusetts' full value decision came in 1961 in Bettigole
v. Assessors of Springfield.8 Twice before Bettigole, in 195969 and
in 1960,70 the court had adroitly sidestepped the difficult problem
of remedy, confining itself to announcing that the statutory requirement that assessors "make a fair cash valuation of all the
7..""
required
estate, real and personal, subject to taxation ..
full value, uniform assessment of all taxable property.7" In the
first case, the court evaded the issue by holding that the collection of the tax on the 1959 tax roll had rendered the question moot
for that roll, and that the court could not assume that the assessors would fail to do their clear duty on the then uncompleted
1960 roll.73 When the assessors did precisely that in 1960, the
court again refused to confront the question of remedy, holding
that the record74 was insufficient to enable the court to fashion
effective relief.
Fast footwork by the parties and the lower courts in Bettigole
enabled the 1961 roll to be reviewed by the Supreme Judicial
Court after the Board of Assessors had adopted an illegal roll, but
before levy or collection of the tax based on roll.75 This forced the
In re Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 32-33, 166 A.2d 763, 769 (1961).
68. 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961).
69. Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339 Mass. 89, 157 N.E.2d 880 (1959).
70. Stone v. City of Springfield, 341 Mass. 246, 168 N.E.2d 76 (1960). It is interesting
to note that the plaintiff, Leland A. Stone, was cocounsel with Philip E. Saks in the Carr
case. Saks was the attorney for plaintiff in Stone. See Note, 75 HARv. L. REV., supra note
3, at 1380-82.
71. Act of Feb. 20, 1786, ch. 50, § 1, [1785] Mass. Acts 523 (current version at MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 38 (West Supp. 1976-77)).
72. The statutory duty of the assessors, of course, is to assess all taxable
property in the city at its full and fair cash value as determined in their honest
judgment, without discriminatory treatment of any persons or property. "The
standard . . . established by G.L. c. 59, § 38, is the fair cash valuation of all
the real and personal estate subject to taxation. .. ."
Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339 Mass. 89, 91, 157 N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (1959) (quoting Waltham Watch & Clock Co. v. City of Waltham, 272 Mass. 396, 412, 172 N.E. 579,
585 (1930)).
73. The court clearly was aware of the practical problems involved in invalidating an
entire assessment roll. See Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339 Mass. 89, 91 n.3, 157
N.E.2d 880, 893 n.3, where the court cites Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580,
130 A.2d 15 (1957) and E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132
A.2d 563 (1957), pointing out their treatment of the problems of wholesale relief.
74. Stone v. City of Springfield, 341 Mass. 246, 249, 168 N.E.2d 76, 78.80 (1960).
75. Since this case was brought before the court after the town board voted to adopt
the illegal assessments, and while "[tihe effort to raise money by this invalid assessment
has not gone so far as to make the case moot," it was distinguishable, and distinguished,
from Carr. Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 235, 178 N.E.2d 10, 11
(1961).
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court to find a remedy, but a peculiarity of the Springfield assessors' procedure greatly limited the applicability of the relief. The
Springfield assessors, it was stipulated, first found the full value
of each taxpayer's taxable property 7 and then calculated assessments at the fixed percentages of the already established full
value for six different administratively established classes of
property.77 Thus, the remedy was easily constructed: The court
ordered the assessors to have their computer skip the last calculation and simply print the full value already established as the
assessed value. 8 In this way, the court was even able to avoid a
windfall of extra revenue to the taxing municipality: "To the full
fair cash values thus fixed, a new tax rate can readily be applied,
determined after taking into account the higher aggregate assessments from the use of full and fair cash values . . . . 7
The Bettigole remedy appears to have worked well-but only
for Springfield, and even there this was only in the shortrun. In
the 1962 Census of Governments, the assessment sales price figures for Springfield ranged from 81% to 96% presumably reflecting the corrected roll required by Bettigole.80 Comparable figures
in the 1967 Census had dropped to the 72% to 73% range"' and
by the 1972 tally, the range was down 56% to 58%.82 Assessment
equity, as measured by the coefficient of intra-area dispersion,
was also not permanently improved. In the 1962 Census it was
26.2%11 dropping to an excellent 8.77% in 1967,11 thereby making
Springfield one of only 107 assessing units out of 1,401 surveyed
by the Census Bureau in that year to have a lower than 10% coefficient of intra-area dispersion." In 1972 the coefficient of intraarea dispersion was up to 14.9% just at, if not over, the threshold of acceptable quality. 8 The drop in ratio and quality in
Springfield presumably reflected the failure of assessments to
follow inflation. As one can see from Appendices I and II, Springfield's ratios were virtually unique among the Massachusetts
76. Id., 178 N.E.2d at 11.
77. Id. at 226, 178 N.E.2d at 12-13.
78. Id. at 237-38, 178 N.E.2d at 19.
79. Id. at 238, 178 N.E.2d at 19. Compare this with the legislation passed in Kentucky
to achieve this goal, discussed at notes 184-190 infra.
80. 1962 CENSUS RATIos, supra note 15, at 145 (Table 22).
81. 1967 CENSUS R TIos, supra note 15, at 133 (Table 19).
82. 1972 CENSUS RATIOs, supra note 15, at 79 (Table 11).
83. 1962 CENSUS RATIOS, supra note 15, at 145 (Table 22).
84. 1967 CENSUS RATIOS, supra note 15, at 133 (Table 19).
85. Id.
86. 1972 CENSUS RATIOS, supra note 15, at 79 (Table 11).
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cities surveyed. There was no general or lasting movement to full
value assessment.
Subsequent case law confirms the inadequacy of the
Bettigole remedy, which the Census studies suggest. In three
cases during the fourteen year period which followed Bettigole,
the court struggled inconclusively with the problem of full value
assessment before it finally relinquished primary responsiblity in
1974 to administrative supervision.
7 plaintiff unsuccessfully atIn Leto v. Board of Assessors,"
tempted to obtain a judicially mandated reassessment of an entire roll. 8 Presumably reacting to Bettigole, the assessors had
doubled assessments "to approximately 100% of fair cash value
for each such parcel."" The court found, however, that there was
no basis for believing that the prior assessments had been a uniform fifty percent of full value. On the contrary, an actual revaluation of commercial and industrial properties (about twenty
percent of the tax roll) had produced increases which were from
three to nineteen times the prior valuation.' Finding the allegations "diffuse and confusing," 92 the court sustained a demurrer to
the bill, largely because there were no allegations of "a deliberate
and substantial violation of the . . . requirements that property
tax valuations . . . be proportional . . . [and] equitable relief
[was not] shown to be practical."93 It should be noted that these
requirements were not unrelated. Relief as exemplified in
Bettigole could be practical only where there was a deliberate
departure from full value; only if the assessors found and then
altered full value could they be ordered to restore the original
finding.
87. 348 Mass. 144, 202 N.E.2d 922 (1964).

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 145, 202 N.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 149, 202 N.E.2d at 926.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148, 202 N.E.2d at 925. The court may also have expected the revaluation

begun with commercial property to be voluntarily continued to the remaining 80% of the
roll without the "drastic" intervention of a court order. If so, it was probably an overly
optimistic expectation, since in his 1976 report to the Supreme Judicial Court, discussed

in the text accompanying notes 113-116 infra, the State Tax Commissioner reported that
the plan Wilmington submitted to achieve a revaluation at full value had been rejected.

Defendant's FirstProgressReport, Feb. 27, 1976, at Appendix 8 (Supreme Judicial Court,
No. 73-219 Eq.)(submitted in accordance with Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of
Corps. & Taxation, 74 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2405, 321 N.E.2d 641 (1974)) [hereinafter cited as
Sudbury First ProgressReport].
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In two later cases, the court retreated from the restrictive
position of Leto. In 1965, in Coan v. Board of Assessors94 owners
of new residential properties sought relief, alleging overassessment in relation to older properties because of the failure of assessments to reflect inflation. The court ordered the assessors to
file a comprehensive plan of revaluation to take effect January 1,
9 a 1968 decision direct1967.11 In Bennett v. Board of Assessors,"
ing reassessment by 1970, the same approach was followed with
of deliberate
an express disclaimer of a requirement of a showing
7
violation as prerequisite for injunctive relief.1
During the same period, the court also considered the problem of individual property owners assessed at amounts higher
than the general, albeit illegal, proportion of value. In 1965
Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Board of Assessors" overruled an earlier
Massachusetts case99 requiring a taxpayer seeking a lower assessment to prove assessment at more than full value. The court
granted the taxpayer a reduction to the common ratio, based on
a showing of a "policy or scheme of valuing properties or classes
of property at a lower percentage of fair cash value than that
percentage in fact applied to the taxpayer's own property."' ' In
a 1973 decision, Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. City of Sommerville,'"'
the court held that a taxpayer seeking individual relief must show
individual overassessment and exhaust administrative remedies
94. 349 Mass. 575, 211 N.E.2d 50 (1965). Plaintiffs alleged assessment at an average
rate of 34%, with some assessments as low as 10% and some higher than 60%. Plaintiffs'
bills for declaratory and injunctive relief were taken pro confesso, defendants having
waived answer. Plaintiffs proposed a decree which would enjoin continued illegal assessment for the future, including 1965 and 1966, but in the same proposed decree suggested
that if a comprehensive plan for revaluation were filed within 30 days, the decree should
be suspended as to 1965 and 1966 and made effective as to 1967. The court seized upon
this suggestion as a means to avoid the difficulties which barred relief in Leto and which
were suggested in Bettigole.
95. Id. at 579, 211 N.E.2d at 52-53.
96. 354 Mass. 239, 237 N.E.2d 7 (1968).
97. Id. at 241, 237 N.E.2d at 9. The court refused to impose a provision of the Coan
decree, which had required the use of professional appraisals. The court stated that such
outside work would not be required absent a showing that the municipal employees were
incapable or could not be trusted to do it on their own.
98. 348 Mass. 366, 203 N.E.2d 811 (1965).
99. City of Lovell v. County Comm'rs of Middlesex, 152 Mass. 372, 25 N.E. 469
(1890).
100. Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 348 Mass. 366, 377, 203 N.E.2d 811,
819 (1965). The court, inter alia, relied on Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260
U.S. 441 (1923), and also reacted to the restrictions which it had two weeks earlier,
speaking through the same justice, imposed on public actions in the Leto decision. See
text at notes 87-93 supra.
101. 363 Mass. 756, 298 N.E.2d 693 (1973).
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before seeking judicial intervention. In Board of Assessors v.
Shop-Lease Co., 0 a case decided in the following year, the court
sensibly held that in applying the capitalization of income approach'"3 to an overassessment appeal involving a commercial
property, the assessors were not estopped from using the actual
tax cost resulting from fractional assessment, rather than the
theoretical tax cost that would result from application of the
actual tax rate to a 100% assessment." 4 Board of Assessors v.
Sqarzi 05 reaffirmed the availability of relief to an individual taxpayer to have his assessment reduced to the common ratio.
In 1974, in Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. &
Taxation,"'o the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts again
sidestepped, but perhaps finally resolved the question of remedy
on a general basis. Massachusetts law had long given the Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation the power to visit any town,
"inspect the work of its assessors, and give them such information and require of them such action as will tend to produce
uniformity throughout the commonwealth in valuation and as102. 74 Mass. Adv. Sh. 107, 307 N.E.2d 310 (1974). The parties stipulated that
assessments in Lynn were made at 30%. Justice Reardon dissented, objecting that the
majority effectively sanctioned the illegal assessment.
103. Income capitalization bases value on the present worth of future earnings. Income currently attributable to the property is computed, projected into the future, and
then discounted in accordance with the rate of return for investments entailing similar
risks. Noncommercial property can be valued under this system by imputing to it rents
earned by comparable realty. Comment, 68 YALE L.J., supra note 3, at 345 n.41.
104. The calculation of value on the capitalization of income basis involves determination of net income, i.e., income after all expenses, including real estate taxes. Thus, the
process as applied to a real estate tax review proceeding is somewhat circular in that the
result of the calculation will determine the assessment, which will determine the tax
payable, which will determine the results of the calculation. To cut through this circularity, appraisers use a "combined capitalization rate." This rate is the sum of the appropriate interest rate and the equalized tax rate. The latter rate is the nominal tax rate
multiplied by the common ratio of assessed to full value. If, for instance, using the figures
set forth in Lynn, the appropriate rate of return is 10%, the nominal tax rate is $20 per
hundred, and the common ratio is 30%, then the combined capitalization rate would be:
10% + (20% x 301) = 10% + 6% = 16%. A property with a net income of $154,450, asin
Lynn, would produce a full value of $154,450+ 16% = $965.312. Applying the 30% common ratio would yield an assessment of $289,593. Obviously, if, as the taxpayer in Lynn
argued, the full nominal tax rate is used, rather than the equalized tax rate, the resultant
value, and therefore the assessment, will be much lower. Specifically, this would yield a
$514,800 value (10% + 20% = 30%; $154,450 + 30% = 514,833) and a $154,440 assessment
($514,800 x 30% = $154,440).
105. 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1691, 329 N.E.2d 121 (1975). See also Coomey v. Board of
Assessors, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1684, 329 N.E.2d 117 (1975).
106. 74 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2405, 321 N.E.2d 641 (1974). The unpublished report of the
Master in this case is a repository of information about assessment in Massachusetts and
elsewhere.
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sessments,"' 7 as well as power to supersede local assessors if they
"fail to perform their duties."'' 8 This power apparently had never
been used, and the Commissioner was no more eager than the
court to tackle the difficult problem of enforcing 100% valuation.
Therefore, the Commissioner administratively limited the exercise of his powers to educational and advisory activities. 9 It remained for the Town of Sudbury, which had voluntarily undertaken a full value reassessment and therefore was being discriminated against in allocation of state aid, to ask the Supreme Judicial Court to require the Commissioner to exercise his power."'0
The court denied present injunctive relief because the Commissioner had stated that he would perform any duty which the court
found he possessed."' The court, however, retained jurisdiction
and ordered the Commissioner to make periodic reports on his
2
progress in complying with the decision."
The Commissioner's first progress report, filed fourteen
months after the decision,"' showed a strong, but still largely
unsuccessful attempt to enforce full value assessment. The Commissioner soundly established a four-part program aimed at securing revaluation of the approximately 1.8 million parcels in the
351 assessing jurisdictions in the state:" 4
(1) compliance programs developed by each community (or by
the State in the event of the community's default) pursuant to
statewide guidelines;
(2) State supervision and management of community compliance programs including public information support and enforcement;
107. Act of June 6, 1898, ch. 507, § 3, [1898] Mass. Acts 473 (emphasis added)
(current version at MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58, § 1 (West Supp. 1976)).
108. Act of Feb. 20, 1786, ch. 50, § 3, [1785] Mass. Acts 525 (current version at MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 27 (West 1968)). It is interesting to note that this power to
remove and replace local assessors, which also existed in Kentucky, see note 141 infra,
has in practice proven to be of little value in forcing local assessors to develop and implement full value assessment programs. Intransigence on the part of the assessor usually
reflects the attitude of the local budgetary and governing bodies, which would prevent
effective operations by a state imposed successor assessor. See Sudbury First Progress
Report, supra note 93, at 26; Note, 60 Ky. L.J., supra note 32, at 148.
109. Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 74 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2405, 321 N.E.2d 641, 647 (1974).
110. 321 N.E.2d at 643.
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id. at 649. The six-month period for filing the first such report began when the
judgment was entered on Aug. 27, 1975, eight months after the decision.
113. The Sudbury FirstProgress Report, supra note 93, was filed on Feb. 27, 1976.
114. Id. at 3-12.
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(3) general technical assistance; and
(4) long-range upgrading of State and local assessment capabilities.
In reviewing the local plans submitted, the Commissioner took
account of "the composition of the tax base and the size of the
community and the existing ratio of assessments.""' Despite the
moderation of the Commissioner's approach and the flexibility of
his standards, the results were very limited. Of the 351 communities, only 126 (36%) had submitted plans which the Commissioner approved, 54 (15%) more had received conditional approval and 67 (19%) were approved subject to affirmative local
action, such as appropriation of necessary funds. On the other
hand, 76 communities (22%), including two-thirds of the cities in
the state, had either no plan at all, or had their plan rejected by
the Commissioner. The remaining 28 communities (8%) had submitted, or resubmitted, plans too late for evaluation in the Report.

1 6
1

Thus, Massachusetts' fourteen year experience seems to indicate a judicial inability to deal with fractional assessment except (1) where the assessors cooperate by finding full value from
which, in a separate step, they deliberately depart, or (2) in very
small municipalities. Fourteen years after the "revolutionary"
decision in Bettigole, the court assigned the problem to an administrative agency. The results of administrative supervision are not
yet apparent.
3.

The 1965 Cases: Floridaand Kentucky
a. Florida:The Homestead Exemption

The decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Walter v.
Schuler"' starts on a note of almost pungent realism. It exposes
in midpoint one of the most serious and practical obstacles to full
value assessment in Florida, but ends on a note of utter judicial
fantasy, leaving actual implementation of its full value direction
to a later case and to strong administrative and legislative action.
The court opens its discussion with the blunt statement that
"from all accounts the tax roll of Duval County for 1964 is a
mess."" 8 The court attributed this condition to a gradual deterio115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965).
Id. at 82.
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ration of the assessment roll since 1941, resulting from the assessor's continuation of a system he had inherited from prior asses19

sors.

The "mess" had two defects. It violated the constitutional
mandate of assessment at a "just valuation," but more importantly, because of the Florida homestead exemption of $5,000 of
assessed value, it "redound[ed] to the unfair advantage of homestead over nonhomestead property."' 20 The court emphasized the
second point:
The enormousness of circumvention of the command of the Constitution in the assessment of property in Duval County is plain
from the figures in the final decree. There were more than 96,000
homestead exemptions in 1964 and 51,000 of these were wholly
exempt from taxation.'
Thus the court's problem was to fashion a remedy that would
force an elected assessor to suddenly make taxpayers out of 51,000
previously exempt families.
In fashioning the required remedy, the court lost all contact
with reality. In the final portion of its opinion, the court acknowledged that although it had spoken much about "just valuation"
which it referred to as "X," it had said
nothing about how to set it within the bounds prescribed by the
legislature . .

.

.The more we ponder the problem the more

difficult the solution appears. But settle it we must and we have
concluded after earnest study that the sensible way to do so is
to adopt the chancellor's idea that "fair market value" and "just
valuation" should be declared "legally synonymous" and that
such is the best way to arrive at the definition of "X." The
former term is a familiar one and it, in turn, may be established
by the classic formula that it is the amount a "purchaser willing
but not obliged to buy, would pay to one willing but not obliged
to sell."
If assessors will apply that test and in doing so observe the
seven guideposts in § 193.021, justness should be secured to the
taxpayer and the tangle that has developed should be unraveled.'
The seven guideposts referred to by the court are a detailed
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85-86 (quoting Root v. Wood, 155 Fla. 613, 21 So. 2d 133 (1945)).
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statutory prescription adopted by the legislature in 196323 two
years before Walter. This statute, however, raises as many questions as it answers. The statute requires that assessors consider
seven factors in arriving at a just valuation:
(1) the present cash value of the property;
(2) its present use and the highest and best use to which it
might be put in the near future;
(3) its location, size or quality;
(4) the cost of the property;
(5) the present replacement value of improvements;
(6) the condition of the property; and
(7) the income it yields.
There are many problems with these statutory standards. First,
they are circular. The standard "present cash value" is traditionally defined as the price a willing buyer will pay in cash, and the
amount that a willing seller will accept. 24 Thus, the first factor
for consideration becomes the very answer we seek. The other
factors are no more helpful-instructing the assessor to consider
present and future use, or cost and present replacement value,
does not tell the assessor what weight to give to each. Finally, the
court ignored the administrative problem of applying these seven
standards to each property in the entire tax roll, consisting (as the
court noted in another context) of 96,000 homestead parcels' 5 and
an unmentioned number of nonhomestead parcels. This massive
job, moreover, had to be done between June 28, 1967 (the date of
the decision), and completion date of the 1965 roll. The only
reference, even oblique, to the administrative problem is the supreme court's rejection of the trial court's suggestion that each
assessment of the 1964 roll, which was shown to be at "approximately 40% of its value,' 2 be doubled to produce a full value
roll.'2
The assessors of Duval County and county assessors in seven
of the other sixty-six Florida counties apparently succeeded in
applying the admonitions of Walter. In Burns v. Butscher,'28
123. Act of May 31, 1963, ch. 63-250, § 1, [1963] Fla. Laws 600 (amending FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 193 (West 1961)) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.011 (West 1971 & Supp.
1976-77)).

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Root v. Wood, 155 Fla. 613, 622, 21 So. 2d 133, 137-38 (1945).
Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81, 85 (Fla. 1965).
Id. at 84.
Id. at 86.
187 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1966).
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which reached the supreme court a year after Walter, the court
cited a 1965 survey which showed "that in [these] eight counties
assessments are made on the basis of 100 per cent of valuation
while the range is from that figure to 17.54 per cent in a certain
county." 29
Burns was an action by taxpayers against the Governor and
the State Department of Revenue to require the department to
seek statewide compliance with Walter by exercising statutory
supervisory powers over local assessors in a directory, rather than
in a merely educational way. 3 ' The state, seeking to justify and
maintain its purely educative and advisory role, contended that
active supervision of assessors would be an encroachment on the
powers of local assessors as state constitutional officers., 3' The
court rejected this position on textual grounds and, more importantly, because "exercise of unbridled discretion by 67 Tax Assessors without their being anchored to any master plan would result
in the imbalance already so clearly indicated.' 3 2 Having found
that the State Department of Revenue had power to require 100%
assessment, the court specifically held that:
[T]he Comptroller is authorized to institute suits to secure
obedience by officials of duties devolving upon them in relation
to the tax laws and observance of pertinent regulations promulgated by the Comptroller . . . [and] is commanded to investigate the conduct of Tax Assessors . . . dealing with tangible
personal property and to recommend to the Governor removal
of such of them as willfully fail properly to discharge the duties
put upon them by the Constitution, Florida Statutes, ... and
regulations promulgated pursuant to it .... 133
Finally, the statute was interpreted "as providing for complete
reevaluation and reassessment [by the Comptroller] of a tax roll
129. Id. at 596.
130. Id. at 595.

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 596. The court, quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.31 (West 1958), further
stated:
[T]he Comptroller was declared to have "general supervision of the assessment
and valuation of property, under the supervision of the State Budget Commission, so that all property will be placed on the tax rolls and the valuation thereof
"
will be uniform and equal, as required by the Constitution ....
Bums v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1966). The statute also gave the Comptroller
power to prescribe forms and procedures, to set standards of values, and to publish an
assessment manual. These statutory provisions were part of a 1943 enactment, which
apparently had never been put into effect by the administrators.
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prepared by an assessor" ' if necessary to achieve "uniformity
and equality in taxation between the taxpayers of the several
counties as well as throughout the state."'35
b.

Kentucky: Ripeness for Reform

Kentucky appears to have had substantial success in achieving full value assessment after its court of appeals decided
Russman v. Luckett 35 in 1965. Analysis of that decision and its
sequel indicates that Kentucky had at least three elements contributing to this notable result.
Procedurally, Russman raised the issues in a broad and ripe
manner. The case was a consolidated appeal in three lower court
actions. The first was a declaratory judgment and mandamus
action by plaintiffs who were "taxpayers, parents of school children, and students who attend school,""13 all claiming direct injury from illegal fractional assessment. The second'3 8 was a suit
by owners of intangible personal property, demanding declaratory relief against systematic overassessment of that class of taxable property as compared to real property, and raising equal protection as well as state constitutional issues.' 3 Finally, a resident
property owner and taxpayer brought the third action " seeking
to enforce a provision of the Kentucky statutes which provides
that an assessor may be removed from office "for willful disobedience of any. . order. . . or for misfeasance or malfeasance...
or willful neglect in the discharge of his duties . . ...
-" Faced
with this range of plaintiffs who were directly involved and the
varying set of requests for relief, the Russman court forcefully
attacked the problem of relief, holding that:
134. Id. at 596.
135. Id.
136. 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965). See Note, 100% Assessment in Kentucky, 64 Ky.
L.J. 98 (1965), for an exceptionally comprehensive and realistic analysis of the factual
situation leading to the decision noted, and its probable consequences.
137. Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Ky. 1965).
138. McDevitt v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1965).
139. Ky. CONST. § 172 provides:
All property, not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be assessed
for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair
voluntary sale; and any officer or other person authorized to assess values for
taxation who shall commit any willful error in the performance of his duty, shall
be deemed guilty of misfeasance, and upon conviction thereof shall forfeit his
office, and be otherwise punished as may be provided by law.
140. Miller v. Layne, 391 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1965).
141. Act of March 25, 1960, ch. 186, § 9, [1960] Ky. Acts 866 (amending Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 132.370(3) (Bobbs-Merrill 1955)) (current version at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
132.370(3)(Bobbs-Merrill 1971)).
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1. Immediate compliance with. . . the Constitution and the
implementing statutes is an impossibility. . . . An attempt to

have all property reassessed retroactively poses insurmountable
obstacles and would work injustice in many respects. Assessed
valuations heretofore made must stand.
2. [A] reasonable time must be allowed within which not only
the Commissioner of Revenue and the county tax commissioners
may act, but within which taxing authorities, and perhaps the
legislature, may prepare themselves, with due consideration for
the taxpayers, for this significant revaluation of taxable property.
3. [The constitutional and statutory full value requirements
mean full value, and, starting with the January 1, 1966 assessment (six months after the decision), the state and local assessing authorities] will be held strictly accountable for the performance of their

. . .

duties. .

.

. Misfeasance or malfeasance

in this connection on or after the above designated date would
certainly be willful.'
Legislatively, the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution
and assessment statutes favored strong enforcement. The full
value requirement was firmly embedded in the Constitution,
precluding easy legislative overruling of Russman.4 3 The same
constitutional provision contained the above quoted provision for
removal of wilfully underassessing assessors, which forms the
threatened sanction of the decision. Finally, the State Tax Commission had the statutory power not only to find county assessment ratios, but to apply them to each of the assessments in a
county to produce equalization.'
Administratively, the court found that:
[T]he Department of Revenue, and other bodies, have already
done commendable work which should greatly simplify the task
of reassessing property throughout the Commonwealth. Apparently reliable statistics are available which will enable county
142. Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 699-700 (Ky. 1965). The demand for penalty was rejected because although the defendant was guilty of a violation of the law,
extenuating circumstances dictated that no penalties should be imposed prior to Jan. 1,
1966, the date by which assessments were to have been corrected in accordance with the
Russman opinion. Miller v. Layne, 391 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Ky. 1965).
143. See note 139 supra.
144. Act of March 11, 1942, ch. 131, § 23, [1942] Kentucky Acts 591 (current version
at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 133.150 (Bobbs-Merrill 1971)). These specific powers were held
to bar an action by the State Tax Commissioner for a writ of mandamus to require a local
assessor to assess at full value on grounds of adequate remedy at law. Luckett v. Monson,
465 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1971), discussed in Note, 60 Ky. L.J., supra note 32, at 146.
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tax commissioners to perform their task without the necessity
of new
and independent appraisals of each item of taxable prop145
erty.

The reference is to an ongoing program of assessment reform,
which had been described in glowing terms ten years before
Russman. It had begun as a result of legislative action in 1949 and
was based on the development of a professionally competent
State Department of Revenue to train and assist elected local
assessors and their staff. Key areas were development of assessment procedure manuals, assistance in installation of modern
assessing and recordkeeping systems, and technical help both
with difficult individual assessments and revaluations in particular areas. 4 ' Without this administrative readiness, presumably
more than six months time would have been required to implement full value.
4. InterclassInequality: Tennessee
Several unusual real property tax situations combined to
produce Southern Railway v. Clement,4 ' the Tennessee decision
cited in Hellerstein. First, railroad property in Tennessee was
assessed directly by the State Board of Equalization while other
real property was locally assessed.' By longstanding practice,
which had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
19401 as a valid de facto classification, state assessments of railroad property were at, or close to, full value, while local assessments of nonrailroad property were fractional. 5 ' Second, Tennessee's remedies for complaining taxpayers were also unusual. On
the one hand, the State Board of Equalization was authorized by
statute to increase or decrease local assessments either on a piecemeal or on a bulk basis 5 ' to achieve the uniformity mandated by
the state constitution' and the full value assessment mandated
by statute.'5 3 On the other hand, the Tennessee courts refused to
145. Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
146. F.L. BIRD, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX: FINDINGS OF THE 1957 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS 74-75 (Brookings Institution 1966)(citing Martin, Progress in Assessment
Administration; A Case Study (National Ass'n of Assessing Officers 1955)).
147. 57 Tenn. App. 54, 415 S.W.2d 146 (1967).
148. Id. at 57, 415 S.W.2d at 147-48.
149. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
150. Southern Ry. v. Clement, 57 Tenn. App. 54, 61, 415 S.W.2d 146, 149 (1967).
151. Act of Jan. 24, 1919, ch. 1, §§ 7-8, [1919] Tenn. Pub. Acts 5-6 (repealed 1973).
152. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28 (1955)(amended 1971).
153. Act of Apr. 12, 1907, ch. 602, § 4, [1907] Tenn. Pub. Acts 2047 (repealed 1973);
id. § 32, at 2083 (repealed 1973).
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grant relief to a taxpayer who is assessed at more than the prevailing rate, but at less than full value.'54
The combination of these factors led the Tennessee railroads
to launch a two-pronged attack in 1966. The Louisville and Nashville Railway Co. commenced a private action in federal court,
which led to a decision that federal due process required that
railroad assessment be lowered to the prevailing level of local
assessments. 5 ' At the same time, the.Southern Railway began a
public action in state court 56 (which resulted in the decision cited
in Hellerstein) to require the State Board to increase to full value
the assessments of locally assessed property in the two counties
where the railroad's property was taxed. The petition in Southern
Railway was granted, but because the taxes for the years in question had already been assessed and collected, it was granted on a
prospective basis only.'
B.

The Legislative Responses
1.

Retreat From Full Value: Connecticut, New
Jersey and Tennessee
a.

Connecticut

In order to understand the legislative response to
Ingraham,51 one must keep in mind that Connecticut subjected
to its property tax personal property used for commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes, and all motor vehicles. 59 The
discrimination complained of in Ingraham was the tax inequity
between classes: motor vehicles assessed at 100%, business personally assessed at 90% and real property assessed at 50%.111 The
initial legislative response was to amend the provision affecting
assessment of real property revising the original mandate that
real property "shall be liable to taxation at its present true and
actual valuation,"'' to read that real property "shall be liable to
taxation at a uniform percentage of its present true and actual
Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S.W. 193 (1901).
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Public Serv. 'Comm'n, 389 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1968).
Southern Ry. v. Clement, 57 Tenn. App. 54, 415 S.W.2d 146 (1967).
Id. at 75, 415 S.W.2d at 155-56.
E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957).
159. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1733, 1750 (1949) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
12-57 to 12-58 (1975)).
160. E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957).
161. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1738 (1949) (repealed by Act of June 21, 1957, ch. 673, § 6,
[1957] Conn. Pub. Acts 1090) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-64 (Supp. 1976)).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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valuation, not exceeding one hundred percent of such valuation,
to be determined by the assessors." 6 ' No change was made in the
provisions affecting motor vehicles or other personalty; there the
standard remained "actual valuation. ' ' ' 3
The 1957 legislative attempt to legalize the administrative
practice of underassessing real estate in relation to motor vehicle
and business personalty seems to have avoided judicial censure,
although the legislation was clearly defective on at least two
grounds. First, it delegated to assessors, who are administrators
and not legislators, the authority to classify property for tax purposes, without establishing standards to apply in deciding the
relative tax burdens to be borne by the different classes of
property. Second, Ingraham went beyond the issue of clear violation of the statute to add:
Nor can we overlook a further matter in demonstrating the
impropriety of pursuing the rule of fractional valuation. When
assessors adopt such a rule, they indirectly assume a role which
rightfully is not theirs to play. For, if such a rule is applied, the
grand list will obviously be smaller in amount than it would be
if the mandate of the statute were carried out. Under such circumstances, the borrowing power of the municipality is affected, since its indebtedness may not exceed specified percen'
tages of the grand list. 64

The 1957 legislation continued this power of the assessors over
municipal borrowing. Under familiar principles of constitutional
law, a grant to administrators of either the power to classify for
tax purposes or to set debt limits requires clear legislative standards. 65
The defects of the 1957 amendment were prospectively eliminated by further amendment in 1974, which requires each municipality to "assess all property for purposes of the local property
tax at a uniform rate of seventy percent of present true and actual
value ...

."66 Since Connecticut, in another rather unusual sta-

162. Act of June 21, 1957, ch. 673, § 6, [1957] Conn. Pub. Acts 1090, repealing CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 1738 (1949)(current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-64 (Supp. 1976)).
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1747 (1949)(current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-63

(1975)).
164. E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 380, 132 A.2d 564,
566 (1957).
165. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, ch. 2 (abridged
student ed. 1965); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
166. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-299, §§ 1,3, [1974] Conn. Pub. Acts 726-27 (codified
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tutory provision, has long required revaluation for assessment
only once in ten years,"6 7 and since the 1974 amendment introducing the seventy percent requirement also extended revaluation
periods which would have expired between 1974 and October 1,
1978, to the later date, the seventy percent requirement will be
gradually introduced. Thus, eighteen years after Ingraham, Connecticut has a statutory scheme for the introduction of uniform
seventy percent assessment over the six years commencing October 1, 1978, and no procedure for requiring better compliance with
this new dispensation than was afforded to the full value requirement in effect from 1860 to 1951.
b.

New Jersey

Events following Switz v. Township of Middletown justified
the majority's projection, as expressed by Justice Wachenfeld,
that the legislature would rescue the court from having to enforce
its postponed decree.' 68 Subsequent enactments have thus far preserved fractional assessment.
In 1960 the New Jersey legislature introduced the concept of
"taxable value" into the assessment process. 6 9 Taxable value is
"that percentage of true value as shall be established by each
county board of taxation as the level of taxable value to be applied uniformly throughout the county."' 7 A special lower valuation standard was provided for agricultural land and improvements.' 7 ' These changes were generally upheld in 1962172 and they
have effectively avoided compliance with full value assessments
except where localities have decided to comply.
c.

Tennessee

The Tennessee legislature has adopted a series of measures
seeking to prevent implementation of full value assessment. The
initial reaction to the Southern Railway v. Clement73 decision
at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-62a (1975)).

167. See Comment, 68 YALE L.J., supra note 3, at 336-37 n.7.
168. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
169. Act of June 15, 1960, ch. 51, § 1, [1960] N.J. Laws 432 (amending N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 54:4-23 (West 1940))(current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-2.25 (West 1960)).
The percentage chosen must be between 20% and 100%. Id. § 2, at 432 (amending N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23 (West 1940))(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-2.26 (West 1960)).
170. Act of June 15, 1960, ch. 51, § 1, [1960] N.J. Laws 432 (amending N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 54:4-23 (West 1940))(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-2.25 (West 1960)).
171. Id. § 23, at 444 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-1 (West 1940)) (codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-1 (West 1960)).
172. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
173. 57 Tenn. App. 54, 415 S.W.2d 146 (1967).
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was the adoption in 1967 of a sliding scale of assessment ratios:
The new ratios started at fifteen percent in 1968 and were to increase five points each year until 1972, at which time forty percent would be required, with a final increase to fifty percent in
1973. This scale was subject to two provisos: In no case was a
jurisdiction to assess at less than its median assessment ratio
found by the State Board of Equalization in 1967, and all reassessments were to be at fifty percent. 7 1 In 1973, when the fifty
percent level should have been reached, a new classified standard
75
was set:'
Public Utility Property
Industrial and
Commercial Property
Residential and
Farm Property

55%
40%
25%

At the same time, the statutory standard of value was changed
in a potentially significant way. The usual formula of "actual
cash value," defined to mean "the amount of money the property
would sell for, if sold at a fair, voluntary sale,' ' 7 was replaced
with "its sound, intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes of
sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer without consideration of speculative values.' 77 The intent of this change seems to
be to bar the use of actual sales as the measurement for value.
By substituting a rule requiring judgment, rather than mere measurement of objective facts, this might insulate assessment from
both private and public challenges based on sales studies.
2.

No Significant Response: Massachusetts

The Massachusetts legislature's main response to the fourteen years of full value litigation was an abortive attempt to
amend the constitution to allow classification and passage of a
few technical measures to ease local reassessment. The constitutional amendment, passed by the legislature in 1968 and 1969,
would have given the legislature power to "classify real property
174. Act of May 26, 1967, ch. 325, [1967] Tenn. Pub. Acts 915 (amending

TENN.

CODE ANN. § 67-605 (1955)) (repealed 1973).
175. Act of May 3, 1973, ch. 226, § 6, [1973] Tenn. Pub. Acts 708-41 (repealing TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 67-601 to 67-649 (1955)) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-611 (Supp.
1975)).
176. Act of April 12, 1907, ch. 602, § 6, [1907] Tenn. Pub. Acts 2049 (repealed 1973).
177. Act of May 3, 1973, ch. 226, § 6, [1973] TENN. PU. Acrs 708-41 (repealing TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 67-601 to 67-649 (1955)) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-606
(Supp. 1975)).
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according to uses and . . . provide for the assessment, rating
and taxation thereof at different rates in the different classes so
'
This was
established, but proportionally in the same class."
overwhelmingly rejected by the voters in 1970.'11 Presumably, the
amendment was intended to enable the legislature to preserve, at
least to some extent, the prior administrative discriminations
which would have been eliminated by full value assessment. Precisely what kind of classification would have been required to
preserve the status quo is unclear.'80 Laws were passed authorizing municipalities to fund reassessment and mapping contracts
by the sale of bonds and to cooperatively contract for such services.'8 1 Finally, over the opposition of the state tax commissioner,"' the legislature required local assessors to specify
annually their methods of assessment to the state tax commission, which could revise them subject to review by the Board of
Tax Appeals.'83 This reportedly was intended to insulate residential assessments made on a depreciated cost basis against attack
as being at a lower proportion of market value than assessments
of commercial property;1 84 its effect is untested.
178. 1 Mass. Senate J. (July 15, 1968), at 1722-26; id. (May 14, 1969), at 1188-94. See
First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 358 Mass. 554, 559 n.6, 265 N.E.2d 848, 852
n.6 (1971).
179. Letter from Comm'r Owen L. Clarke to Gov. Michael S. Dukakis (Sept. 12,
1975), at 5, reprinted in Sudbury First Progress Report, supra note 93, at Appendix 11
[hereinafter cited as Clarke Letter]. A similar proposed amendment is again working its
way towards submission to the voters. Id.
180. The statewide Census Bureau figures indicate approximate equality between
residential property and commercial and industrial property in all three years (38% to 37%
in 1962, 48% to 50% in 1967, and 48% to 44% in 1972). See text accompanying note 18
supra, and Appendix I. Indeed, in 1972 single-family residences were, according to this
source, overassessed at 49% compared to 44% for commercial and industrial property. On
the other hand, a recent study concludes that full value assessment would shift taxes from
commercial and industrial property to residential property in 250 of the 257 communities
studied. W. WHEATON, THE STATEWmE IMPACT OF FULL PROPERTY REVALUATION IN
MASSACHusETrS 3-5 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 1975). The average effect was calculated as a 16.3% increase in residential taxes, offsetting a decrease in tax of 23.0% on
industrial property and 12.0% on commercial property. The larger, older industrial cities
showed an even greater increase in residential taxes of over 20%. Id. at 5.
181. Act of April 3, 1961, ch. 313, [1961] Mass. Acts 172 (amending MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 40, § 4 (West 1958))(current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 4 (West
Supp. 1976-77)); Act of Aug. 30, 1973, ch. 720, § 20, [1973] Mass. Acts 703 (current
version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22B (West Supp. 1976-77)).
182. Clarke Letter, supra note 179, at 4.
183. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, ch. 853, [1975] Mass. Acts 1076 (amending MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 38 (West 1973))(codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 38 (West
Supp. 1976-77)).
184. Clarke Letter, supra note 179, at 3-4.
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3. Legislation to Assist Full Value Assessment:
Kentucky and Florida
a. Kentucky
Kentucky's legislative response to Russman v. Luckett'" was
swift and effective. The legislature enacted a three-part program,
consisting of (a) changes in the state property tax, (b) a freeze on
the amount of local budgets, and (c) a temporary special tax on
public utilities. 8 ' These changes were intended to offset what
were regarded as undesirable side effects that otherwise would
have flowed from full value assessment.
Kentucky is one of the few states to have a general state
property tax,' 7 and taxes certain personal property as well as real
property. In order to avoid an increase in the state property tax
as a result of 100% assessment, the rate of state tax was reduced
from 5% to 1.5%.' In recognition of the generally prevailing gross
underassessment of personal property, the statutory scheme for
personal property was revised to grant exemption to most personalty and to impose only a low-rate state tax on other personalty.' 9
To prevent the increase in tax burden and local spending
which would have resulted from applying fractional assessment
tax rates to full value assessments, the legislature limited localities to utilizing a "compensating tax rate."190 This meant a tax
185. 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
186. The first two measures were adopted at an extraordinary session of the legislature called in response to the decision in Russman v. Luckett, id. See notes 188-192 infra.
The third was adopted in the following year. See note 195 infra.
187. In 1974 about 26 states had general property taxes at the state level. In many of
these states, personal property was exempt or partially exempt on a de facto or de jure
basis. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1974, Table 9, at 13-40 (U.S.
Dep't of Commerce 1974).

Ky.

188. Act of Sept. 17, 1965, ch. 2, § 1, [1965] Ky. Acts (1st Ex. Sess.) 3 (amending
§ 132.020 (1942))(current version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.020 (Bobbs-

REV. STAT.

Merrill Supp. 1976)).
189. Id.

190. Act of Sept. 17, 1965, ch. 2, § 11(6), [1965] Ky. Acts (1st Ex. Sess.) 17 (amending Ky. REV. STAT. § 132.010 (1942))(current version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.010
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)); id. § 3(3)(a), at 7 (amending Ky.

REV. STAT.

§ 160.470

(1942))(current version at Ky.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.470 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)); id.
§ 4(4)(a), at 10 (amending Ky. REv. STAT. § 160.476 (1942))(current version at Ky. REV.
STAT.

ANN.

STAT.

§ 160.477 (1942))(current version at Ky. REV.

§

160.476 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)); id. § 5(6), at 11 (amending KY.
STAT. ANN.

REV.

§ 160.477 (Bobbs-Merrill

Supp. 1976)); id. § 6(2), at 12 (amending Ky. REV. STAT. § 157.440 (1942)) (current version
at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.440 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)); id. §§ 8(6)-8(7), at 14
(current version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 68.245 (Bobbs-Merrill 1971)).
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rate which, when applied to the current assessment roll, would
produce the same revenue as was raised in 1965. Two exceptions
to this rule were provided. First, the concept of "net assessment
growth" was introduced and defined as the excess of the value of
new property added to tax rolls over the value of property deleted.' 9' These additions normally come from construction of new
buildings or restoration to taxability of previously exempt property, and deletions from demolition of improvements or attainment of exempt status. Taxing jurisdictions were permitted to
increase their revenues by an amount equal to the compensating
tax rate applied to the net assessment growth in addition to the
1965 levy.19 Second, municipalities were permitted to increase
their revenues by ten percent by complying with special procedures, including a referendum. 9 '
Finally, a transitory public utility tax was imposed in 1966
to prevent a windfall tax savings by public utilities. These companies had been taxed at local rates on state assessments which
were often at a higher ratio to full value than the local common
ratio. 94' The tax prevented a windfall benefit to the public utility
companies, which would have resulted from application of reduced local rates to the unchanged full value assessment. The
remedy was to set the tax rate applicable to such companies in
1966 and 1967 at that which would produce the same revenue as
in 1965.'15 The widespread use of the permissive ten percent an191. Act of Sept. 17, 1965, ch. 2, § 7, [1965] Ky. Acts (1st Ex. Sess.) 13 (current
version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.425 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)).
192. Act of Sept. 17, 1965, ch. 2, § 3(3)(b), [1965] Ky. Acts (1st Ex. Sess.) 7 (amending Ky. REV. STAT. § 160.470 (1942))(current version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.470
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)); id. § 8(7)(b), at 14 (current version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 68.245 (Bobbs-Merrill 1971)). See Note, Property Tax Revenue Assessment Levels and
Taxing Rates: The Kentucky Rollback Law, 60 Ky. L.J. 105, 118-40 (1971).

193. See note 192 supra.
194. Real property of utilities, as well as all other property including intangibles and
franchises, was subject to assessment by the State Tax Commission. Ky. REV. STAT. §§
136.120, 136.160. Such assessments were then allocated among, and added to the assessment rolls of, the local jurisdictions in which the property was located. Id. § 136.170. The
value found for the entire property of a utility was subject to equalization, based on an
overall state equalization factor; the value assigned to property in each locality was not
adjusted to the local common ratio. See Luckett v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 331
S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1960). Therefore, even if the factor used to equalize was exactly the
correct number for the entire state, such property would have been overassessed in all
municipalities with a common ratio below the state average.
195. Act of March 18, 1966, ch. 41, § 1, [1966] Ky. Acts 357 (expired 1967). Letter
from E.D. Ballard, Assistant Commissioner for Ad Valorum Tax, Dep't of Revenue, Commonwealth of Kentucky to Irving Lesnick (July 19, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Ballard
Letter] (a copy of which is on file in the office of the Hofstra Law Review). See BALLARD,
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nual revenue increase by school districts and the growth in the
amount of property owned by public utilities (due to plant and
facility expansion) prevented a reduction in actual tax burden
when the special tax expired at the end of 1967.198
Three other features of Kentucky law warrant discussion.
Two of the features predated Russman, but were given added
importance by full value assessment. In 1964 the legislature created a Board of Tax Appeals to hear individual taxpayer complaints of overassessment, as well as appeals concerning other
aspects of the local tax system. 9 ' Judicial review of Board decisions is also provided.'98 Since Russman, the Board generally has
provided quick, relatively easy relief to taxpayers claiming overassessment.'99 Kentucky has long made special provision for assessment of farm land, which in general limits the assessment of
such acreage to its value as farm land, even if it has a higher value
for other purposes."' Since the sale of farm land normally reflects
its potential value for other use, full value assessment (tied to a
market value approach) makes such a statutory limitation more
important than it was under fractional assessment. Finally, a
constitutional amendment and implementing legislation adopted
in 1972 granted a senior citizen homestead exemption of $6,500
for residences owned and occupied by persons over the age of
sixty-five.2"' The exemption was later legislatively amended to
8-11 (La. Mfg. Ass'n
1966).
196. BallardLetter, supra note 195.
197. Act of March 21, 1964, ch. 141, §§ 1-12, [1964] Ky. Acts 502 (current version
at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 131.310 to 131.370 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)).
198. Id. § 12, at 507 (current version at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131.370 (Bobbs-Merrill
1971)).
199. Note, 60 Ky. L.J., supra note 32, at 91. Taxpayers assessed by state and county
assessors have a "reasonably adequate procedure for protesting that assessment," id. at
94, while those assessed by city assessors do "not have an adequate administrative remedy." Id. at 97. The author suggests that the best way of improving the remedy available
to city-assessed taxpayers is to require cities to use county assessments, which, under Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 320.285 (Bobbs-Merrill 1971) was optional. Note, 60 Ky. L.J., supra at
97. Instead, however, the legislature seems to have encouraged use of county assessments
by lowering the costs. Under former law, as it stood in 1970, each city adopting the county
roll had to pay approximately 1.5¢ per $100.00 of assessment with no maximum. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 320.285 (Bobbs-Merrill 1971). This section subsequently was amended
by Act of March 27, 1972, ch. 245, § 4, [1972] Ky. Acts 1036, to reduce the charge to
0.50 per $100.00 of assessment, with a maximum of $40,000 or $50,000 depending on the
size of the roll.
200. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.450 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976). This is basically the
same provision as was passed by the New Jersey Legislature but invalidated by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
201. Ky. CONST. § 170 (amended 1971, further amended 1975); Act of March 27, 1972,
RECENT EVENTS IN PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION IN KENTUCKY
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provide for cost-of-living index adjustments in the amount of the
assessments would
exemption, thus reflecting an expectation that
202
values.
escalated
inflation
as
increased
be
b. Florida
Florida's legislative response to its full value decision was
significantly more limited than that in Kentucky. A rate rollback law was enacted in 1973 to keep local property tax revenue
constant as assessments increased.2 13 In addition, the supervisory
powers of the state tax commission have been strengthened several times." 4 In 1974, legislation was passed (1) requiring that
assessors recognize the effect of local building moratoria on subdivision land values2 5 and (2) prohibiting the assessment of vacant land or building lots "until such time as development is
begun on the platted acreage.

' 20

This measure suggests that as-

sessments were expected to keep pace with rising values, but the
absence of any increase in the homestead exemption, the benefit
of which would be greatly reduced by such increasing assessments, suggests the contrary.2 7
ch. 285, § 4, [1972] Ky. Acts 1336 (codified at Ky. REv. STAT.

ANN.

§ 132.810 (Bobbs-

Merrill Supp. 1976)).
202. Act of March 27, 1974, ch. 140, § 1, [1974] Ky. Acts 315, (codified at Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 132.810 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976)).
203. Laws 1973, ch. 73-172, § 13 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 200.065 (West Supp.
1976)).
204. These enactments are now codified in FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 195 (West Supp. 197677) and include a grant of "general supervision," id. § 195.002; a direction to "prescribe
and furnish all forms to be used by property appraisers," id. § 195.022; and "prescribe
reasonable rules and regulations for the assessing . . . of taxes," including "uniform
standards and procedures for computer programs and operations for all programs installed
in any property appraiser's office after July 1, 1973," id. § 195.027. In addition, authority
was given to publish- a manual of instructions for appraisers, available to the general
public, id. § 195.062. This chapter gives the state revenue department power to increase
or decrease budgets of local assessors, id. § 195.087, establishes a state fund to assist local
assessors in making appraisals and setting up properly equipped offices, id. § 195.094. In
addition, it provides for state prepared approved bidder lists and standard contracts for
reappraisal and mapping projects, id. § 195.095. Finally, provision is made for periodic
"in-depth review" by the state of each locality's assessments at least once every four years,
with requirements of local action to correct any over-or-under-assessment found on a
classified or stratified basis. Id. § 195.096-097.
205. Act of June 18, 1974, ch. 74-234, § 19, [1974] Fla. Laws 661 (codified at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 193.507 West Supp. 1976-77)).
206. Id. § 9, at 649, amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 195.062 (West 1971)(codified at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 193.062 (West Supp. 1976-77)). This prohibited assessment on building lots
until 60% were sold. Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 75-12, § 1, [1975] Fla. Laws 33 substituted
the less specific language quoted in the text.
207. Compare the cost of living feature of the Kentucky Senior Citizen Exemption
discussed in the text at note 202 supra.
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THE PATH AHEAD IN NEW YORK STATE

Several facts clearly emerge from this review of the experience in the six states that have had Hellerstein-type, full value
decisions. First, such decisions are not self-executing; in four of
the six states, full value has been repealed or effectively postponed by subsequent legislative action or inaction. Second,
strong state administrative control of the assessment process
seems to be a requirement for full value assessment. Local assessors will not comply without policing and the courts alone cannot
perform this task. Third, the legislative response required to
achieve full value must confront the underlying causes of the
practice of fractional assessment to avoid unfair windfalls and
unfair burdens on particular classes of taxpayers."' 8 Fourth, full
value decisions do not eliminate the need for effective relief to
individual taxpayers who are unfairly treated.
Based on the experience elsewhere, it appears unlikely that
New York will follow Kentucky's example in achieving full value
assessment for a number of reasons. For example, there seems to
be an inverse relationship between effective tax rate and
receptivity to full value assessment: New York has a high effective tax rate.2 19 In addition, while New York does have an active
208. An example of overt legislative action to replace the kind of arrangement that
now frequently occurs by informal (and illegal) administrative action is the 1976 legislation permitting partial exemption on a diminishing basis over the years, to new industrial
and commercial improvements. Act of June 8, 1976, ch. 278, [1976] N.Y. Laws 697 (to
be codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 485-b); id. ch. 279, at 699 (to be codified at

N.Y. REAL

PROP. TAX LAW

§§ 489-mm to 489-oo).

209. It is difficult to compare tax rates between states because they are set locally
and display a wide range within each state, depending on levels of expenditures for schools
and other local government functions, which are related both to the wealth of the community and the local assessment ratio. The range and average of nominal tax rates reported for the jurisdictions sampled by the Census Bureau in 1971 are suggestive:
STATE

NOMINAL TAX RATE

High

Low

Average

Connecticut

7.8V

1.8 %

5.1%

Florida

3.8(

1.9%

2.6'/

Kentucky

2.1'

0.71";

1.1%

Massachusetts

20.7 %

4.2(,,

12.8%

New Jersey

17.5 1/

4.1'/

7.9%

Tennessee

7.3'r/
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and technically proficient Board of Equalization, 10 there does not
seem to be a statutory basis for -a claim that it has power to
require adherence to its mandates, along the lines of Russman2 1
and Sudbury.1 2 Moreover, giving the State Board enforcement
which
powers would require a substantial increase in its budget,
23
is unlikely to occur in the present political climate. 1
Based on 1972 CENSUS RATIOS, supra note 15, at 110 (Table 12). The figures presented are
the high, the low, and the arithmetic mean of "nominal rates" for selected jurisdictions.
The number of jurisdictions sampled are: Connecticut-16; Florida-24; Kentucky-7;
Massachusetts-22; New Jersey-li; and Tennessee-7.
From the above data it appears that the two states which made the most progress
toward full value had nominal tax rates under 3%; the four that resisted had nominal tax
rates over 5%. The comparable figures from New York, from the same source, are: high:
16.6%; low: 6.0%; average: 11.3%. Fourteen jurisdictions were sampled. Further support
for this hypothesis is found in an examination of per capita property tax burdens presented
in Netzer, supra note 26, at 90-91 (Table 5-1)(based on 1962 data). Three states which
strongly resisted full value decisions-Massachusetts, New Jersey and Connecticut-were
among the four with the highest per capita property tax burdens in a study of 1962
property taxes. Their ranks and rates were:
Massachusetts

Highest

$166.09

New Jersey

3rd Highest

$153.47

$139.61
4th Highest
Connecticut
Kentucky and Florida, which have had more success in moving to full value, had low ranks
and rates.
$ 45.85
8th Lowest
Kentucky
Florida

19th Lowest

$ 80.38

New York ranked fifth, with a rate of $138.19. The correlation is not completely clear,
however. Tennessee, which has also resisted full value, had the lth lowest rate at $48.13.
210. The history and present structure of the State Board is dealt with in Town of
Smithtown v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 238, 248, 183 N.E.2d 66, 71, 228 N.Y.S.2d 657, 664 (1962)
and 2 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON STATE AND LOCAL FiNANCES: THE REAL PROPERTY TAx 72-77 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TEMPORARY STATE
COMMISSION REPORT]. The statutory provisions are now in N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW art.

2 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
The State Board of Equalization has developed a computerized system of assessment
recordkeeping, which will produce an update of sales-based indicated assessment for
single-family residential property and assist the assessor in valuing other kinds of property.

STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, THE NEW YORK STATE REAL PROPERTY

A NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION FOR LocAL OFFICILrS (1975). (The
Massachusetts State Tax Commission is working on development of a similar system.
Sudbury First Progress Report, supra note 93, at 10-11.) The New York system is in
operation or being installed in twelve towns, one city and three upstate counties. Memo
from William E. Underwood, Director, Local Assessment Service, a copy of which is on
file with Hofstra Law Review.
211. Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
212. Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 74 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2405, 321 N.E.2d 641 (1974).
213. The Board's 1976-77 budget was $7,166,600. Letter from Samuel J. Stein, DirecINFORMATION SYSTEM:
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The problems of New York City present a special reason for
not expecting full value assessment in New York State. Among
the City's problems is the flight of the middle class to the sub-

urbs. One factor that encourages middle class homeowners to
remain as residents of the City is the policy of assessing one and

two family residential properties-of which there are over a half
million in New York City-at less than thirty percent of market
value, while assessing commercial properties at or above market
value. 21 These fractional assessments, combined with a constitutional property tax rate limit 2 5 and differences in commutation
costs, make it cheaper for many people to live in the City and pay
its full city income and sales taxes, than to move to the suburbs
and pay the lower commuter income taxes2 16 and the equal or
slightly lower suburban sales taxes. 17 Increasing the tax burden

on these people would accelerate the flight to the suburbs, cause
the loss of other tax revenues, further the racial imbalance in City
schools, and ultimately result in a drop in the value of City real
2
estate. '1

tor of Research and Statistics, State Board of Equalization and Assessment, to Irving
Lesnick (July 28, 1976) (a copy of which is on file in the office of the Hofstra Low Review).
214. N.Y. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, PROPERTY CLASS ANALYSIS
REPORT of May 22, 1975 (a copy of which is on file in the office of the HofstraLaw Review).
215. N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 10(f) (McKinney 1969). This section also limits property
taxes by counties, other cities, villages and school districts within cities. Since the major
property tax in suburban areas is the school tax imposed by non-city school districts,
suburban taxes are, for all practical purposes, not affected by this limit.
216. New York City residents pay a graduated tax of from 0.7% on taxable income
of $1,000 to 3.5% on taxable income in excess of $30,000. N.Y. GEN. CiTY LAW 25-a (Subd.
3-A) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76). For nonresidents of New York City the tax rate is 0.45%
on all wages earned in the City and 0.65% on all earnings from self-employment carried
on in the City. In addition, nonresidents are given the benefits of certain income exclusions
ranging from $3,000 where income is less than $10,000 to $1,000 where income is less than
$30,000. N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAW § 25-m (Subd. 2-A)(McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
217. The state imposes a sales and use tax of four percent pursuant to N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 1105 (McKinney 1972). New York City is empowered to impose sales
and use taxes in addition to the state tax under § 1210 of the Tax Law and the additional
rate is presently four percent, resulting in a total sales tax of eight percent (New York City
Administrative Code § A46-2.0 (1975)). Likewise, counties are authorized to impose additional sales taxes under § 1210. In both Suffolk and Westchester counties, the additional
sales tax is three percent, resulting in a total sales tax of seven percent. Nassau County
increased its additional sales tax from three percent to four percent'(total of eight percent)
effective Oct. 1, 1976.
218. In this connection, it is significant that Boston's plan to comply with the full
value decisions in Massachusetts was rejected by the state tax commission. Sudbury First
Progress Report, supra note 93, at Appendix 8. In Newark, New Jersey, the members of
the City Council had expressed a willingness to go to jail for contempt of a court order
when they were granted a legislative postponement of the full value mandate. See N.Y.
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Reassessment at full value in a high tax jurisdiction creates
real difficulties, even in suburban and rural areas. A key problem,
at least in urban and suburban areas of New York, is that commercial and industrial property tends to be assessed at a higher
ratio than single-family residential property 19 Any attempt to
shift tax burdens from such overassessed properties to residential
owners meets strong political opposition, since the average underassessed single-family house is occupied by several voters. This
reflects real and difficult questions of tax policy and equity, particularly when homeowners, as well as commercial property owners and tenants, are suffering from the effects of inflation on other
as fuel and utility bills, interest
costs of property ownership such
22
costs.
insurance
rates, and fire
Another problem, which has been recognized to some extent,
is that of the senior citizen, or for that matter anyone, who has
owned a house so long that the inflation's effect on value and tax
rate would make it impossible to bear a full share of the tax
burden. A limited senior citizen's exemption now exists in New
York to mitigate this problem. 22' But the elderly taxpayers tend
to be underassessed; their assessments generally have not increased as much as real estate values. Full value assessment,
therefore, would shift the tax burden from owners of new residential property and owners of commercial property to owners of old
residential property. 222 Three remedies have been proposed to
deal with this problem: 22' (1) classification schemes-lower assessment or taxes on residential property; 224 (2) circuit breaker
Times, June 27, 1976, § 11, at 4, col. 6.
219. See, e.g., TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 210, at 25-29.
220. The overall cost of living index for July 1976 for U.S. cities was 170.1. U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Detailed Report 1976, at 7
(Table 1). The index for the costs of homeownership was 190.7, id., which indicates that
these costs increased at a faster than average rate since the 1967 base year. The index for
property taxes associated with homeownership was 166.6, again indicating that other
elements, e.g., maintainence and repair (199.3) and fuel oil and coal (247.3), increased
faster than property taxes. Id. at 10 (Table 4). The index of residential rent was 144.4,
lower than the overall index, indicating that inflation has been slower in raising costs of
apartment dwelling than costs of homeownership. Id.
221. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 467 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
222. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 210, at 20-21.
223. A valuable discussion of this problem and a listing of states which have adopted
the various remedies (as of 1971) is found in Shannon, FederalAssistance in Modernizing
State Sales and Local Property Taxes, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 379, 384 (1971).
224. See, e.g., Act of May 3, 1973, ch. 226, § 6, [1973] TENN. PUB. AcTs 708 (repealing
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-601 to 67-649 (1955)(codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-611 (Supp.
1975)), which is discussed in the text accompanying note 175 supra. See generallyInterna-
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proposals-statutes under which real estate taxes are limited in
relation to total income;22 5 and (3) homestead exemptions-uniform assessment with specified exemption for owner
occupied homes. 22 A related problem of equity would exist if such
relief is given to homeowners: should corresponding relief not be
given to renters? But if such relief is to be given to renters, how
can it be structured to assure that its benefits pass through to the
27
tenant and are not appropriated by the landlord?
tional Ass'n of Assessing Officers Newsletter, June 1974, at 101-05 (a copy of which is on
file in the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
225. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(7) (West Supp. 1975-76); Benedict, Designing
Circuit Breaker PropertyTax Relief, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 19 (1966). See also TEMPORARY STATE
COMMISSION REPORT at 154-56.

226. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 132.810 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1976) (providing
an exemption of $6,500 in 1974 dollars). See also Segal, Taxation Without Rectification,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1976, § 11 (Long Island Weekly), at 18, cols. 1-6. For the view that
homestead exemptions "involve a substantial amount of injustice," see 1 ADV. COMM'N
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, The Role of the States in Strengthening the Property
Tax 79-80 (Gov't Printing Office 1963).
227. One possible method of handling this issue is illustrated in New Jersey Gross
Income Tax Act of 1976, ch. 47, § 54A, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 166. The proceeds of
this newly enacted income tax were earmarked "exclusively for the purpose of providing
property tax relief and for the purpose of reducing or offsetting property taxes, including
the requirements of Public Law 1975 ch. 212 [relating to the funding of public schools]
and homestead exemptions under 1976 Assembly Bill No. 1330. . . ... Id. § 54A:9-25, at
166. This provision is now embodied in a constitutional amendment. Assembly Concurrent Res. 140, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 206-07, approved Nov. 2, 1976. To give owners of
cooperative apartments and residential tenants a benefit equivalent to the homestead
exemption on owner occupied dwellings, "a homestead credit of $65.00 against the tax
otherwise due ....
" was provided. New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act of 1976 ch. 47,
§ 54A:4-3, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 111.
The exemption on owner occupied property is complex. Although called an exemption, it is really a tax credit, calculated on the basis of the lesser of (a) the equalized
assessment of the property, up to $10,000 and (b) two-thirds of the equalized value of the
property. This base figure is then multipled by the sum of (a) 1.5%, plus (b) 12.5% of the
effective tax rate to produce the credit, but the credit in no case can exceed one-half of
the tax. Public Laws 1976, ch. 72, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 234, to be codified at N.J.
STAT. 54:4-3.80 to 4-3.94. The maximum credit on any house with an equalized assessment
of more than $15,000 in a jurisdiction with a 5% effective tax rate would be:
(1.5% + [12.5% X 5%]) X $10,000=.02125 X $10,000 =$2,125
The effect of this credit at various levels of equalized value would be:
Equalized
Value
$ 15,000
25,000
40,000
75,000
100,000
150,000
200,000

Tax before
Credit (at 5%)
$

750
1,250
2,000
3,750
5,000
7,500
10,000

Credit ($2,125
or 50% of tax)
$

375
625
1,000
1,875
2,125
2,125
2,125

Net Tax
$

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss2/1

375
625
1,000
1,875
2,875
5,375
7,875

Effective
Rate of Credit
50%
50%
50%
50%
42%
28%
21%
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Yet another problem of equity exists where differences in
assessment level have been capitalized, i.e., reflected in the price
of property.228 If the value of a particular parcel has been inflated
by underassessment and an increase in assessment will merely
cancel an unearned increment which would otherwise have accrued to its owner, no problem of equity exists. If, however, the
property was purchased at an inflated value in reliance on the
continued existence of the prior treatment, problems of equity
arise. This is particularly true if, at the same time, those who
purchased property in high assessment areas at lower prices (reflecting relative overassessment) are now to realize a windfall
gain. A transitional period during which taxes would be based on
the average assessed value over a three-or five-year period would
be a possible solution, or at least an amelioration, of this prob2 29
lem.
New York, on the other hand, does have one factor pressing
toward full value assessment which seems stronger here than in
the other states studied. Probably because of its high effective tax
rates,20 generally favorable procedural statutes, 23' and well developed case law rules on valuation, 2 New York has always been a
Finally, the Tenants' Property Tax Rebate Act, Public Laws 1976, ch. 63, 1976 N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. 222, to be codified at N.J. STAT. 54:4-6.2-54:4-6.13, requires owners of
multiple dwellings (over four units) to pay to tenants a rebate equal to the tenants' share
(based on the proportion of the building's rent roll) of the property's share (based on the
proportion of the property's assessment to the municipality's assessment roll) of 50% of
the aid to education monies paid to the municipality from the fund established by the
state income tax act.
228. See J.F. DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 364-66 (3d ed. 1963);
R. LINDHOLM, PUBLIC FINANCE AND FISCAL POLICY 285 (1950).
229. A five-year floating average of equalized assessed value is used to determine the
constitutional tax limits on cities, counties, villages and certain school districts in New
York. N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 10 (McKinney 1969). A bill to give local legislative bodies the
power to ease the effect of increased assessment on existing residential property, by exempting from tax any increase in assessment on such structures, with the amount of
exemption decreasing and finally disappearing over an eight-year period, was introduced
in the 1975 legislature, but died in committee. Assembly Introduction No. 12328, 1975
New York Legislative Record A972.
230. See note 209 supra.
231. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 720 (McKinney 1972) which relates to proof
of assessment ratio. Although the traditional "selected parcel assessment method" has
been widely and justly criticized, see, e.g., Koeppel, supra note 3; Comment, 68 YALE L.J.,
supra note 3, at 348 n.59, it did provide a definite procedure where other states had a
vacuum. See In re Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 28, 166 A.2d 763, 767 (1961). It is also quite significant that special calendars and trial parts for tax certiorari proceedings and special rules
relating to the exchange of appraisals and auditing of owner's income and expense records
are provided by court rules. See 22 N.Y. Code of Rules and Reg. § 660.18 (1st Dep't); id.
§§ 678.1, 678.3 (2d Dep't); id. §§ 839.3, 862.6 (3d Dep't); id. § 104.24 (4th Dep't).
232. The Seventh Decennial Digest, for example, devotes approximately 13 pages to
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leader in real property tax litigation. Until 1975, difficulty in
proving assessment ratio limited the ability of taxpayers to
achieve reductions to a level of assessment lower than that which
the municipality was willing to admit."' The decisions of the
Court of Appeals in Guth 34 and of the Nassau County Supreme
35
Court and the Appellate Division in 860 Executive Towers1 im-36
plementing the 1969 amendment to the Real Property Tax Law,
permit the state equalization rate to be relied on as the sole
evidence of prevailing level of assessment. Under these decisions,
it should be relatively easy for any taxpayer to secure the reduction of an assessment with higher ratio to value than the state
rate. The effect of the decisions, absent reassessment, must be to
continually lower the state rate. This follows mathematically
from the fact that the state rate represents an average of values,
some higher and some lower than the actual rate. If a significant
proportion of the assessments higher than the state rate are reduced to that level, then on the next determination of an average,
the new state rate must be lower than the previous one. And as
the state rate gets lower, more and more taxpayers will be eligible
for, and will avail themselves of, this relief. 3 7 As the resultant
key number 348 entitled Taxation-Valuation-Property. Of these, three pages are devoted to New York cases.
233. See, e.g., Koeppel, supra note 3, at 570 n.16.
234. Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d
367 (1974).
235. 860 Executive Towers, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2d Dep't
1976). This decision followed and expanded Guth, which had left open the question of
whether the state equalization rate was properly'applicable to other assessing jurisdictions
and other years. 860 Executive Towers held that (1) Guth applied throughout the state,
(2) the state rate and its applicability to particular jurisdictions could be proven by the
testimony of expert witnesses without petitioner offering testimony of officials of the State
Board of Equalization, as had been done in Guth, and (3) once the issue of applicability
of the state rate had been determined against a particular taxing jurisdiction for a particular year, it was collaterally estopped from contesting these issues in cases brought by other
taxpayers. The New York Court of Appeals has yet to pass on these issues.
236. Act of April 27, 1969, ch. 302, [1969] N.Y. Laws 699 (codified at N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 720(3)(McKinney 1972)).
237. This can be illustrated by the following model. Assume a jurisdiction with 1,000
properties, with assessment ratios distributed as follows:
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Prospects for Full Value Assessment
Number
of
Properties

Assessment
Ratio

Average
Value
(000)

Value
(000)

Aggregate
Assessment
(000)

3

$1,000

$ 3,000

$ 1,500

40%

10

500

5,000

2,000

30%

250

100

25,000

7,500

20%

500

40

20,000

4,000

237

30

7,110

711

$60,110

$15,711

50%

10%
Totals

1,000

Overall assessment ratio:

$15,711 =

26/

60,110
Assume that in the following year, 1 of the 50% properties, 5 of the 40%
properties and 75 of the 30% properties, assessments are reduced to 26% of
full value. The resulting assessments will be:

Assessment
Ratio

Number
of
Properties

50%

Average
Value
(000)

2

$1,000

40%

5

30%

175

26%

81

20%
10%
Totals

Value
(000)

Aggregate
Assessment
(000)

$ 2,000

$ 1,000

500

2,500

1,000

100

17,500

5,250

*

11,000

2,860

500

40

20,000

4,000

237

30

7,110

711

$60,110

$14,821

1,000

Overall assessment ratio: $14,821 = 25%
60,110
If in the following year, the same thing happens again, with another 81
properties going to the new assessment ratio, the effect would continue:

Assessment
Ratio

Number
of
Properties

Average
Value
(000)

Value
(000)

50%

1

$1,000

$ 1,000

40%

-

500

30%

100

100

26%
25%
20%

500

10%

237

Totals

Aggregate
Assessment
(000)
$

500

10,000

3,000

81

11,000

2,860

81

11,000

2,750

40

20,000

4,000

30

7,110

711

$60,110

$13,821

1,000

Overall assessment ratio: $13,821 = 23/
60,110
* (I x $1,000,000)

+

(5 x $500,000) +

(75 X $100,000) = $11,000,000
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slide in assessment levels snowballs, the tax rate must rise, or
municipal spending drop. In either case, reassessment will become increasingly attractive.23 8
In succeeding years, the assessment ratio would continue to drop. When it got below
20%, it would begin to crumble as taxpayers assessed at 20% became eligible for reduction.
If this did not produce full value revaluation, it would produce chaos.
In reality, of course, three factors would slow this effect. One is the practice of the
State Board of Equalization and Assessment of using a moving average of surveys made
over a period of several years to establish the state rate, which would slow the decline.
See 860 Executive Towers, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604, 610 (2d Dep't
1976). A second is that the typical tax reduction case takes several years to resolve, so
that the effects of such reduction do not show up as soon as the taxpayers become entitled
to them. Third, the parcels which do have their assessments reduced would not necessarily
show up in the sample used by the State Board of Equalization.
238. This was clearly recognized by the court in 860 Executive Towers, id. at 609-10:
It is, no doubt, true that use of the State equalization rate will depress the
average ratio of so-called high ratio property classes, and that, if enough owners
of above-average ratio properties secure reductions in their assessments, the
taxing unit will experience a drop in property tax revenues and a reduction in
the existing equalization rate. However, the answer to this financial dilemma is
not to ignore the rule of uniformity, or to relegate the taxpayer to the timeconsuming and expensive selected-parcel method of proving ratio, which has
heretofore served to limit the number of certiorari proceedings and the amount
of relief secured. Rather, the answer, already provided by the Court of Appeals
in Hellerstein, is for the taxing unit to reassess all of the properties on its rolls.
See also In re Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 32-33, 166 A.2d 763, 766-69 (1971), quoted at note 67,
supra.
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